

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY PREPOSITIONED AFLOAT DURING
AN AMPHIBIOUS REINFORCEMENT OPERATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY PREPOSITIONED AFLOAT DURING AN AMPHIBIOUS REINFORCEMENT OPERATION by LCDR James H. Newport, USN, 99 pages.

This study investigates two command and control options a Joint Force Commander (JFC) might use to employ an Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) combat brigade during a reinforcement of an amphibious assault. The most difficult of such deployments would demand a crisis response employing both USMC and USA prepositioning forces. This study explores a scenario which uses the amphibious enabling capability of the USN/USMC to establish a lodgement and a USMC Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operation to rapidly expand that lodgement to facilitate an Army Prepositioned Afloat heavy brigade.

Joint doctrine and service specific doctrine was reviewed to ascertain compatibility for conducting USN, USMC, and USA afloat prepositioning operations. Both a USN/USMC doctrinal initiative (Tactical Memorandum) on MPF Command and Control, and USA draft doctrine for Army Prepositioned Afloat were used during the evaluation. Lessons learned from USN, USMC, and USA joint amphibious and prepositioning operations were analyzed to determine the potential issues most likely to occur the next time the scenario is executed.

Analyzed are the doctrinal amphibious command and control relationship with Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) as the supported commander, and second a doctrinal initiative with the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) as the supported commander. This study looks at both options as viable, depending on the phasing of the afloat prepositioning operations. The study recommends the optimum command and control structure for the JFC is CATF as the supported commander. If the amphibious assault is separated by sufficient time, however, it is recommended to establish CLF as the supported commander.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Arrival and assembly area
AAR	after action review
ADCON	Administrative control
AMC	Air Mobility Command
APA	Army Prepositioned Afloat
APF	Afloat Prepositioning Force
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
AOA	amphibious objective area
ARFOR	Army Force
ASCC	Army service component commander
ASMP	Army Strategic Mobility Program
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CATF	Commander Amphibious Task Force
CCDG	Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
CLF	Commander Landing Force
CMPF	Commander Maritime Prepositioning Force
CNSF	Commander Navy Support Force
COA	course of action
COMJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
COMJTFSC	Commander Joint Task Force Support Command
COMMARCENT	Commander Marine Forces Central Command
COMMARFOR	Commander Marine Forces

COMSURFWARDEVGRU	Commander Surface Warfare Development Group
CONUS	continental United States
CWC	Composite Warfare Commander
DOD	Department of Defense
FIE	fly in echelon
FLTCINC	Fleet Commander-in-Chief
FM	Field Manual
FMFM	Fleet Marine Field Manual
FORSCOM	Army Force Command
FPO	Fleet Post Office
FRAGO	Fragmentation Order
FSS	Fast Sealift Ships
JATF	Joint Amphibious Task Force
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	Joint Pub
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFSC	JTF Support Command
LANT	Atlantic
LASH	Lighterage Aboard Ship
LF	landing force
LMSR	large medium speed roll-on-roll-off
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARFOR	Marine Force
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEF (FWD)	Marine Expeditionary Force Forward
MPF	Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPSRON	Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron

MRS	Mobility Requirement Study
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSCO	Military Sealift Command Office
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NAVCHAPGRU	Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group
NBG	Naval Beach Group
NCA	National Command Authority
NCC	Naval Component Commander
NEF	Naval Expeditionary Force
NSE	Naval Support Element
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
OPCON	Operational control
OPP	off-load preparation party
OPSEC	Operational security
OTC	officer in tactical command
PAC	Pacific
PHIBGRU	Amphibious Group
PREPO AFLOAT	Prepositioning Afloat
PREPO	Prepositioning shipping
RO/RO	Roll on/Roll off
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SWDG	Surface Warfare Development Group
TAA	Tactical Assembly Area
TACMEMO	Tactical Memorandum
TM	Tactical Memorandum
UNAFF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USA	United States Army
USAMC	US Army Materiel Command
USAMMA	US Army Medical Materiel Agency
USCINCLANT	US Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command
USCINCTRANS	US Commander-in-Chief Transportation

USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USPACOM	US Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	US Transportation Command

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Afloat Prepositioning Force's (APF) operational success in Desert Shield/Storm clearly showed the utility of afloat prepositioning. Both USMC Maritime Prepositioning Force operations and USA and USAF Prepositioning (PREPO) shipping were exceptionally successful programs. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, as publisher of the Joint Force Quarterly, included several articles in the spring 1994 edition on how the Army and the Marine Corps could improve the concept of prepositioning afloat.¹ While other programs are being canceled or drastically reduced, the Afloat Prepositioning Force program has grown with the addition of one PREPO ship to the US Air Force and the development of the US Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) program.² In fact, no one is suggesting replacing or abandoning the program. Rather, the afloat prepositioning of equipment seems to be the only smart thing to do as the US adjusts to diminishing resources and postures more as a CONUS (continental US) based deployable force rather than a forward-deployed force. The National Security Strategy requirement to "deploy robust and flexible military forces" in support of two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies,³ and the force reductions in all services that demands a Joint response to any contingency will require more programs like Afloat Prepositioning Force.

The APF program has recently been expanded by prepositioning a heavy brigade afloat to provide the ability to rapidly introduce into theater heavy Army warfighting forces. One of the seven employment options envisioned is to use the Army Prepositioned Afloat (a sustaining force), to support the deployment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting power projection through a Naval Amphibious Task Force (an enabling force), that has been reinforced by a Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON) operation (a surge force). This scenario will provide the supported CINC an ability to fight 30 days before requiring resupply, with two USMC expeditionary brigades (one brigade amphibious/one brigade MPF), and one USA heavy brigade. The logistic constraint imposed by the use of a USMC amphibious assault employment option, to a range of 50 miles inland, has been overcome. By utilizing an already proven power projection concept, the Army has improved US strategic capability to rapidly deploy a credible-sized heavy force able to conduct sustained operations deep inland.⁴

The Problem

As the Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) program expands the afloat prepositioning concept in such a scenario, the essential question is: How will the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), integrate or phase the Army forces into and through a NAVAL (USN and USMC) operation, and establish the USA as the lead element? The simple solution is to use a common (JOINT) doctrine and train to it. Such an approach will generate a number of questions.

Is there adequate doctrine? Is it specific to this scenario? Has it been practiced or is it theoretical doctrine? In the spirit of the joint world in which we will operate, is it agreed upon?

Can we train to it? Do we have the manning, money, and time to validate the concept? The number of units required for an exercise, the real world operational tempo of the forces that would participate, and the limited funds available for training, all constrain the possibility to operationally test this concept.

The first question to be answered and the question that must be resolved satisfactorily before any operational exercise can begin asks: Is there doctrine? There is doctrine for Command and Control of a Joint Task Force. There is joint doctrine for amphibious operations, which is followed rather closely by Amphibious officers and Marine Corps officers. Although there is not a perfect merging of amphibious warfare doctrine and composite warfare commander doctrine used by Carrier Battle Forces, there is nothing in either that precludes using both to conduct Naval operations. There is doctrine for Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operations. There is joint logistics-over-the-shore doctrine, and the Army has a draft version in progress for Army Prepositioned Afloat. Joint amphibious warfare doctrine and Navy/USMC MPF operation doctrine both address the command and control organization. The Army draft doctrine describes command and control only in general terms that assigns responsibility for designing an organization that works to the supported unified Commander-in-Chief's Army service component commander (ASCC).⁵ There is joint doctrine, service specific USN/USMC and USA doctrine, and initiatives to improve both published and draft. Doctrine therefore exists, but is it common doctrine--agreed upon by each participant? This study intends to answer that question.

The second question is: Assuming doctrine exists, can we make it work? The enormity and complexity of the problem is beyond casual

observation, and will probably be oversimplified by many by answering YES. This author has observed, from the operational staff perspective and from the classroom environment, the complexity of Navy and Marine amphibious operations. Narrowing the focus of thought to just the command and control required between the Navy and Marine components will bring an acknowledgment from both staffs; not easy, but executable with adequately trained staffs. The essential nature of a clear, doctrinal, organization for command and control during amphibious operations is without a doubt an absolute. However, it is quickly apparent when adding a carrier battle group staff to the equation, that not all Naval forces are familiar with Joint Amphibious Warfare doctrine. The merging of command and control organizations between the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) conducting open ocean operations and the Commander Amphibious Task Force conducting an assault, is still being refined. In the Joint Exercise Ocean Venture 93, the Naval Component Commander, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group (CCDG) TWELVE commented in an after action report that there was a lack of amphibious and maritime prepositioning force (MPF) knowledge on his staff. The recommendation was made to assign an officer with amphibious/MPF expertise to group staffs.⁶ There is doctrine, yet as a Naval force there are difficulties with Amphibious and MPF operations because the doctrine is not common, or it is not successfully trained to, possibly both. What happens when one adds an Army Prepositioned Afloat phase to the operation?

This presents an even more difficult question: Do we have time to train to it? The USMC's Maritime Prepositioning Force development suggests we need to bring major components together now for planning and integration. Consider the MPF time line from conception to its first

combat deployment. A joint Army-Navy study of strategic logistics conducted during the mid-1960s, "recommended . . . preposition military supplies for either the Army or the Marine Corps."⁷ The 6th MEB Command Element was activated on 26 July 1983. MPSRON ONE ships were loaded during 1984-1985.⁸ Squadron training was conducted between 1986-1990. Concept proofing was required in November 1990 when the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a deployment order for COMPSRON ONE to support Desert Shield. The Maritime Prepositioning Force concept was validated in 1990 with successful mission execution by all three Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRON). How well an idea works depends on a variety of factors: How many support the idea, how much support do they give, and what is the value (quality) of that support? Can the concept be developed into a real program that stands on its own? Once in programmatic form, training becomes the focus, and the how many/how much/what kind factor applies to preparation of those who will execute the program. The move toward maritime prepositioning took 26 years to develop, train forces, and perfect warfighting skills before its first use. There was time to move from concept to program, to develop doctrine, practice, and refine tactics, before being called on and tested by wartime reality. Today's boiling pots do not suggest the same luxury of time.

Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR October of 1994, with employment of MPF and APA forces to reinforce Kuwait against Iraq's repositioning of combat forces, illustrates the importance of the question of time. Now is the time to develop the command and control organization for conducting a reinforcement of an amphibious operation. Such an operation will require Joint Doctrine, familiar and accepted (agreed upon) by the Naval Expeditionary Force and the Army. Then the only question to answer will

be: Is there TIME to perfect our joint warfighting expertise, before REALITY requires program employment? Research of command and control issues from World War II, GRENADA, DESERT SHIELD, RESTORE HOPE, AND VIGILANT WARRIOR provide further insights a Joint Force Commander (JFC) might face in developing "jointness" among USN, USMC, and USA participants during an afloat prepositioning reinforcement of an amphibious operation.

This study reviewed historic issues in order to predict potential problems in a future event. Having identified issues that once in fact existed, a review of more recent lessons learned should lead to an estimate of the probability for a similar issue arising in the next critical operation. All who participate in after action reviews (AARs) have observed that certain long standing issues continue to reoccur. The combat organization learns via trial and repeated error. The historical review identified two primary issues of concern at the command staff level that have the potential to be the subject of lessons relearned in future operations: unity of command and operating jointly. Grenada and the more recent operations Desert Shield and Restore Hope, were researched to confirm whether a need for concern remains and determine if progress in resolving issues of the past could be confirmed. Finally, current on-going operations (ink still wet on AARs) were investigated to verify the accuracy of conclusions drawn from observation made of historical/recent operations. With the tempo of today's joint operations most likely scenario being a crisis response utilizing JCS Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures, and in light of the US Armed Forces congressional mandate to be Joint, the two areas where the US cannot afford to relearn an old lesson are loss of unity of command and inter-service discord.

Lessons Learned

At the beginning of joint/combined operations in World War II, there was a strong American feeling that only by unity of command (unified command), could the best results be achieved. The most powerful advocate for this view was General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. It was not shared by the United States Navy, but the weight of opinion, to which President Roosevelt gave his support, was on its side. The feeling, then, was that in every theater of war there should be a supreme commander responsible for the operations of all the fighting forces. The issues present were, unity of command and USA/USN divergent views at the command level, and their potential impact on the unity of effort and mission success.⁹

Operation TORCH reveals how the exceptional competence at the command level can compensate for a potentially disastrous inter-service animosity. Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, appointed by the Combined (United Kingdom-United States) Chiefs of Staff as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, in order to conduct an invasion of North-west Africa (Operation Torch) identified and addressed the issue of Army/Navy inter-service discord at the command level. His staff was a superbly organized joint and combined staff. It was predominately an Army staff with USN liaison officers. Gen Eisenhower dealt directly with Army Air Force and Royal Air Force (there was no over-all air command). His staff worked "in co-operation with" Allied Naval Commander and with Allied Force Headquarters. No conflicts arose which required arbitration in Center and Eastern Task Force Commanders, scheduled to conduct the landings at Algiers and Oran. The Western Task Force, however, assigned the landing on the Moroccan coast, was an assault from CONUS with little contact (face

to face) with Allied Force HQ and Allied Naval Commander. Serious friction developed there between USN/USA forces, "which threatened to disrupt preparations." Major General George Patton was commander of the force. Naval commander was Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt. General Eisenhower appears to have understood the superb fighting qualities of General Patton which would be indispensable once ashore. General Eisenhower was effective in persuading General Patton to organize his staff to exploit not only his own expertise, but also that of his chief staff officer. Somewhat out of the norm, Patton's chief staff officer conducted the planning with the naval commander, while Patton himself focused on training the troops. This worked exceptionally well, keeping the ego of Patton from seriously damaging the required coordination between the services. One can only imagine what type of command climate would have been produced had Patton's parting comments been given early instead of at the pre-sail conference when he allowed his service prejudice to be fully expressed:

He . . . predicted that all our elaborate landing plans would break down in the first five minutes, after which the Army would take over and win through. 'Never in history,' said he, 'has the Navy landed an army at the planned time and place. If you land us anywhere within fifty miles of Fedhala and within one week of d-day, I'll go ahead and win.'¹⁰

This attitude illustrates the interservice problem present in the first joint amphibious operation. Although there was no discernable impact on Operation Torch, it clearly was an issue to be seriously considered in future operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Barlow, USAF, in an article in the Joint Force Quarterly, directs the focus of thought toward the decision made by the Joint Chiefs not to place the Pacific theater under a unified command. LTC Barlow contends that both the delay in reaching a joint service

decision and that the decision which violated the principle of unity of command, cost more than material war resources--it delayed the victory and multiplied the casualties the American people had to endure. He further proposes that the decision was the result of fear of offending one of the strong willed dynamic military leaders or his service.¹¹ Interservice rivalry may have created the environment in which a poor decision was made, but the decision created a more intolerable and unacceptable milieu. First it established a competition between strategies in which General MacArthur took questionable risks to promote his strategy. Secondly, it created the opportunity for a breakdown in the supporting supported relationship between Admiral William F. Halsey and General MacArthur when Admiral Chester W. Nimitz further degraded the unity of command in theater by assigning Admiral Halsey a conditional mission while under MacArthur's command.

In reviewing how the break from a unified commander contributed to a questionable command decision it is appropriate to first establish some overall observations. General MacArthur, while serving as USA Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southwest Pacific, worked so well with Admiral Daniel E. Barbey in developing amphibious warfare tactics that together, as an Army-Navy team, they provided a most significant contribution to the development of amphibious warfare. Between 30 June 1943 and 1 July 1945 the 7th Amphibious Forces of General MacArthur and Admiral Barbey conducted 56 amphibious landings.¹² This belief is further influenced by the unsolicited act of General MacArthur upon the successful landing of his amphibious force at Inchon 15 September 1950. Immediately upon determining his success, General MacArthur transmitted the following message to Admiral Barbey, then Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval

District, "The landing was made in the best Barbey tradition."¹³ MacArthur's genius and professional dedication is undeniable, which makes his questionable decision all the more stark. Whatever conditions produced such an event must be guarded against by those of lesser talents. A second observation of the Army Navy teamwork that permeated the 7th Amphibious Force was concluded during the research for this study. On the frontline, the navy and army fought well together. There appeared to be no contention over who was in charge. General Chase, after the Island of Los Negros landing at Hyane Harbor, said of the naval support, "They didn't support us; they saved our necks."¹⁴ A RAND study on joint air command and control noted this same sensitivity during both the Solomons campaign 1942-1944 and Korean conflict saying: "those closest to combat quickly overcome burdensome command arrangements when faced with the prospects of military disaster, and that command and control issues become more contentious the farther one gets from the fighting."¹⁵

There were two strategies competing for pre-eminence. Which was correct can still be debated by history scholars and is beyond the scope of this study. What is of concern was MacArthur's use of his command position to influence Joint Chiefs' decision. As the Joint Chiefs debated the course of action to be followed, MacArthur was developing a different next move, as a result of a memo from his senior planning officer, Col. Bonner Fellers. Col. Fellers' plan appealed to MacArthur's flare for the dynamic and bold. MacArthur continued to develop this new plan in support of his strategy for returning to the Philippians via the New Guinea route and waited for the appropriate time to present it to the Chiefs. Admiral Barbey writes about how all of this planning, and the next operation (a landing at Hyane Harbor on the island of Los Negros) was committed to

showing that MacArthur's strategy was the correct course, and that the allocation of resources should be his. The proposal was held until success in the Admiralties was sure.¹⁶ The day MacArthur was informed of the sure success of the Admiralty operation he sent his new campaign plan to the Joint Chiefs. According to Admiral Barbey, the timing was excellent and "could not have been presented at a more opportune time." In the papers Unit Press called the Admiralty campaign "one of the most brilliant maneuvers of the war." The Associated Press reviewed it as a "masterful strategic stroke."¹⁷ But at what risk, and what cost was the MacArthur strategy bolstered? Were it not for the inadequate preparations of the Japanese, their commander's misread of the situation as it unfolded, and General MacArthur's good luck, the press may have reported its first amphibious defeat.

What was the questionable decision? Land a small combat force, a "reconnaissance in force" five weeks earlier than planned. If it goes well, stay and reinforce it, if not withdraw.¹⁸ The idea of beginning an assault and then based on the enemy's response to decide whether or not to continue the landing is totally foreign to amphibious doctrine. Yet for this assault, General MacArthur personally made the observation and decision to continue. Admiral Barbey recalls in his book this unusual assault:

The landing as originally scheduled for 1 April, with overwhelming force, would have overrun the islands in a few days with a minimum of casualties. Heavy air and naval bombardments would have preceded the landing and probably silenced any shore batteries. Minesweepers, survey ships, tugs, small boats, heavy equipment, artillery, supplies, reinforcements, and construction battalions would have been available when required. As it was, all these elements of a landing force went forward piecemeal, unscheduled, as ships were commandeered and urgent pleas were met. Because of faulty intelligence and the need for haste, a small number of ships and troops was given an almost impossible assignment. In the first few days, the outcome was often in doubt. The fine leadership of General Chase and the courage of his men saved the day. The troops could not have been withdrawn. A disaster

at Los Negros would have set back the Pacific campaign several months at least. The psychological effect of an American defeat on the Japanese would have been tremendous. MacArthur's ability as a military leader would have been questioned and his proposed campaign along the New Guinea coast might have been canceled.

We learned later that the Japanese had about four thousand men in scattered defensive units throughout the two islands, all within easy supporting distance of each other. Fortunately, the Japanese commanding officer had felt sure that the weak landing in Hyane Harbor was but a diversionary attack and that the main effort would follow shortly at the entrance to Seeadler Harbor, and so he refused to concentrate his forces against General Chase during those first two critical nights when the outcome hung in the balance. Had he done so, there is little question that General Chase's force would have been overrun. After the second night it was too late, for reinforcements had arrived and Chase was saved. Looking backward, I have often wondered if MacArthur ever questioned his own judgment in this matter.¹⁹

Adjusting an operation's timing, pushing schedules and putting troops in a hastily planned situation only to prove a personal preference in strategy is dangerous as well as questionable.

Finally, the decision of the Joint Chiefs not to establish a unified commander in the Pacific set the scene for a breakdown in the supporting supported relationship during the Leyte Gulf landing. Admiral William F. Halsey was assigned by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to provide support to General MacArthur's Leyte Gulf landing to ensure that the Japanese fleet could not disrupt the landing. However, Admiral Halsey was to remain under operational control of Admiral Nimitz not General MacArthur. To further open the door for confusion, Admiral Nimitz included in the written orders the discretionary ability for Admiral Halsey to withdraw from screening the amphibious landing should the situation present itself or the possibility of creating a situation where a major portion of the Japanese fleet could be destroyed.²⁰ As we look back and review the circumstance of the events that followed both Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey's decisions, each part of the sequence of events confirms that unity of command above all is the right course to take.

General MacArthur's senior naval staff officer Captain Ray Tarbuck, briefed his General on Japanese intentions, and predicted with uncanny accuracy the Japanese intentions.²¹ Had it not been for the Japanese propensity to quit just before victory was theirs, the Japanese Center Force would have had free access to the beachhead and the 75 newly arriving supply ships.²² The impact upon the momentum of the US victory over Japan could not have been calculated then or now. What is understood, is the central nature of the principle of unity of command, and the need to empower the officer with the requisite authority over all assigned force, that the plan developed and approved can be executed as planned.

URGENT FURY provided numerous lessons learned, or rather lessons relearned. The Grenada experience was chosen because of the Navy Army dynamics at the command level. It was also an operation in which an amphibious operation played a significant part. URGENT FURY clearly indicates that the historical Army Navy rivalry of World War I was still an issue.

The disjointed assembly of command players does not in and of itself indicate interservice dissonance, rather it was a result of a poor crisis response planning capability. The evaluation by Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, US Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT) of potential Navy Marine limitations even with augmenting Special Forces, and his early decision to employ the 82nd Airborne Division was certainly joint thinking.²³ That Major General Norman Schwarzkopf and two additional Majors were the only Army representation assigned to Vice-Admiral Joseph Metcalf III's Joint Task Force 120 headquarters is not necessarily a sign of service bias interfering with an operation.²⁴ It was a consequence of

seriously compressed reaction time and the absence of effective crisis planning mechanics. A sign of distrust between the Army Navy team is clear however, in General Schwarzkopf's account of his assignment to CJTF 120 staff. He quotes Major General Dick Graves, director of operations at Forces Command, speaking of the reason for General Schwarzkopf's upcoming mission, "A lot of Army forces are going to be involved . . . and Washington wants to make sure that the Navy uses them correctly."²⁵ General Schwarzkopf further describes his reception at USCINCLANT's final planning conference the following day as less than cool. There the CJTF, Vice Admiral Metcalf, aggressively questioned what contribution he could make, and the CINC, Admiral McDonald in superior to subordinate curtness spoke directly to him, "Now, for chrissakes, try and be helpful, would you? We've got a tough job to do and we don't need the Army giving us a hard time."²⁶

This may have been the case when there was doubt as to forces actually being used in a combat situation. However, as soon as the operation began, Admiral Metcalf and his army liaison officer General Schwarzkopf functioned as a team. When it was crystal clear that US combat personnel were in fact dying, Admiral Metcalf quickly tapped the Army database for both confirmation of his own ideas, and options when he was out of his element. Again it is clear, when the sense of mission is real and there is a common focus, Army and Navy professionals fight well together. Admiral Metcalf, once he recognized the original plan was being revised by reality, spoke candidly with his deputy, "I will confess that I know very little about ground operations. Would you make up the plans for tomorrow and write the orders that we should give to the forces?"²⁷ General Schwarzkopf proceeded to contribute consistently to Admiral

Metcalf's progress toward mission accomplishment, but not without noting some resistance from members of the team. Upon relating an incident to Admiral Metcalf, regarding having to threaten a USMC Colonel with a court-martial if he did not follow General Schwarzkopf's order to transport Army troops in Marine helicopters to effect the rescue of US students, General Schwarzkopf was made Deputy Commander JTF 120 vice Army staff liaison officer. Admiral Metcalf announced to the entire senior staff, "As of now, Schwarzkopf is the deputy commander of this task force. He is my second-in-command. In my absence, he is in charge, and when he gives an order, you should consider that that order comes from me."²⁸ Essentially, from the first movements of the invasion, Admiral and General had worked effectively as a Navy Army team. Now it was recognized as such officially.

Desert Shield deployment of prepositioned equipment and supplies confirmed the utility of Afloat Prepositioning. The deployment of MPS squadrons Two and Three provided a significant and immediate advantage to the CINC. This rapid deployment of a credible sized combat force with organic logistic for 30 days, was capable of providing logistical assistance to other units--such as a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division which was the first ground forces to arrive in theater. Such joint support contributed to the CINC's decision to push a larger volume of combat units vice logistic units in the early stages of Desert Shield.²⁹ Conducted as an independent MPF operation, there were no doctrinal command and control issues discovered in the review of literature.

Operation RESTORE HOPE lessons learned published both by the Army and Marine Corps provide some key lessons for consideration in future operations. They are centered around planning and phasing joint

activities, the weakness of doctrinal knowledge of the MPF operations, and the fear that a successful operation may hide some basic flaws.

The Marine Force (MARFOR) and Army Force (ARFOR) experienced some simultaneous deployment coordination difficulties. Phasing is critical to rapid buildup: MARFOR enable, ARFOR sustain. A competitive race to get there first is inefficient. Logic supports the USMC's more rapid deployability, to establish the framework through which the USA will rapidly flow to establish heavy longer term sustainability. Critical are the standards of interoperability, and the multiservice commitment to teamwork under Joint Task Force doctrines.³⁰ Pivotal is the limitation of airlift. Airlift should put people and equipment arriving via sealift in arrival and assembly areas at the same time.

Afloat Prepositioning Force use experienced mixed success. The MPSRON off-loaded four ships, while three PREPO ships were unable to off-load. Weather and ship characteristics (deep draft) prevented the ships from off-loading. The core difficulty, lack of familiarity with prepositioning force operations, was the central issue in the USA after action report:

Clearer understanding is required as to who is responsible for making decisions regarding movement/offload of vessels. . . . During Operation RESTORE HOPE, a combination of interrelating circumstances, to include nondoctrinal command relationships, adverse weather and late deployment of transportation throughputters, cumulatively led to problems with the download.³¹

A similar lesson was observed in the USMC after action report which indicates that not all Navy Admirals are familiar with MPS doctrine and operations. Assignment as Commander Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) may occur during the compressed timing of crisis action planning when there will be little or no opportunity for gaining the required expertise. Assignment of CMPF to an Admiral inexperienced in MPF

operations created some inefficiencies and confusion during the beginning of the operations.³² Although temporary fixes were found for most circumstances, and the ones that were too hard to fix did not generate a mission failure, the lesson which should be noted is the need to establish a more thoroughly trained joint team experienced in prepositioned afloat operations.

Assignment of a separate MPF component did not create difficulties largely because it was a Marine operation which did not require detailed coordination/cooperation with other services. The establishment of the JTF Support Command (JTFSC) as a functional command subordinate only to CJTF Somalia however, did create some difficulties. Addressed in both the USMC and USA lesson learned reports, were the difficulties regarding the deployment of a division fulfilling the role of an ARFOR, with the function of providing Joint Theater Logistics. For the purpose of this study it is significant to note the recommendation presented by both USMC and USA: The need for trained, experienced, joint qualified personnel to be identified prior to an operation, who can be included in the early stages of the planning process. Once an operation commences, access to JOPES, and the ability of planners to use its software are critical for coordination. Command and control structure, mission and tasking of subordinate JTF should be included in the JTF OPORD. "The command relationships between the COMJTF, COMJTFSC, and COMMARFOR were not articulated in the JTF OPORD (neither Task Organization, nor Command and Signal), or in any subsequent FRAGOs."³³ This created problems for internal service component operations (ARFOR, JTFSC, DIV commander) and the coordination of priorities with COMMARCENT for airlift and sealift.³⁴

The transition between MARFOR and ARFOR units as the operation progressed was smooth. The transition process was event driven, by functional areas, to include command and control, logistics, local police security, communications, medical, and engineer services.³⁵

USA and USMC operating in a non-perfect world recognized that perhaps the universal need to refine that which works. USA final comments in the Restore Hope lessons learned report states:

Despite recent deployment successes, force projection capabilities must be improved to support our new military strategy. While Operations RESTORE HOPE was an overwhelming operational success, some key areas need to be refined including deployment planning, employment of the strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and prepositioned assets), and command and control during Joint and Combined operations.³⁶

Essentially both USA and USMC voiced the same concern. The US military succeeded because they decided to, yet, therein lies a significant danger. Operating outside of written doctrine presents a short-term fix which may create long-term difficulties. Each raised questions on the methods employed to succeed, as to the wisdom of operating in the same way next time. There was a clear presence of fear that something done in the last operation may be expected in the next, and that may not be the best or most efficient means to employ our scarce resources.³⁷

The most recent operation between Army and Marine prepositioning forces provides the final lesson learned. The APA/MPF operation, VIGILANT WARRIOR, to reinforce Kuwait in October of 1994 indicates there still is a danger of interservice discord. During this operation each service used its own doctrine. Lessons learned are still close hold and remain politically sensitive with no official release available to the author. An interview with a reliable senior planner/executor of the operation states the potential for interference in operational efficiency was

clearly present at the General staff command level. With the potential for interservice rivalry to impact on an operation negatively, the requirement to ensure doctrine supports USN, USMC, and USA joint operations becomes critical. The research will analyze the current and proposed doctrine to answer the primary question in light of the lessons learned.

Scope

This study will review the following current doctrine: Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations; Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 22-10/Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-5, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations; and US Army Field Manual 100-17-1, "Army Prepositioned Afloat" Draft Version 3. The research will consider the arrival of an Army Prepositioned Afloat force, its integration and deployment into the existent Naval Expeditionary Force command and control organization, through an end state of US Army assumption of duties as Commander Joint Task Force, or as Commander US Land Forces, with requisite command, control and authority ashore at the appropriate Headquarters. The operation scenario will follow the envisioned concept of a Naval Expeditionary Force enabling via an Amphibious Group/Marine Expeditionary Force, reinforced by a Maritime Prepositioning Force and an Army Prepositioned Afloat Force. The study will consider issues relevant to forces on-scene and their command and control requirements to facilitate integration Army Prepositioned Afloat.

Key Definitions

Amphibious Assault. The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile

shore. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.

Note: Changes definition in Joint Pub 1-02 dated 1 Dec 1989.)

Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The US Navy officer designated in the initiating directive as commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Commander, Landing Force (CLF). The officer designated in the initiating directive for an amphibious operation to command the landing force. Also called CLF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Composite Warfare Commander (CWC). The officer in tactical command (OTC) is normally the composite warfare commander. However, the composite warfare commander concept allows an officer in tactical command to delegate tactical command to the composite warfare commander. The composite warfare commander wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned; while the officer in tactical command (OTC) retains close control of power projection and strategic sea control operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Functional Component Command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services,

operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Joint Force Commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing command for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (Joint Pub 1-02).

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). A task organization of Marine forces (division, aircraft wing and service support groups) under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific mission. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force components will normally include command, aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy Support Elements). Three types of Marine Air-Ground Task forces which can be task organized are the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Expeditionary Brigade [now referred to as Marine Expeditionary Force Forward], and Marine Expeditionary Force. (Joint Pub 1-02).

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). A task organization of units under one commander formed for the purpose of introducing a MAGTF and its associated equipment and supplies into a secure area. The MPF is composed of a command element, Maritime Prepositioning Ship(s) Squadron (MPSRON), Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and Naval Support Element (NSE). Depending on the threat, appropriate escorts will be included in the task organization.

Maritime Prepositioning Ship(s) Squadron (MPSRON). A group of civilian-owned and civilian-crewed ships chartered by Military Sealift Command loaded with prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support a MAGTF up to expeditionary brigade size. There are three squadrons with four to five ships per squadron. Each squadron has a Navy element commanded by a USN Captain, embarked on a flagship.

Navy Support Element (NSE). The Maritime Prepositioning Force element that is composed of naval beach group staff and subordinate unit personnel, a detachment of Navy cargo handling force personnel, and other Navy components, as required. It is tasked with conducting the off-load

and ship-to-shore movement of maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02).

Subsidiary landing. In an amphibious operation, a landing usually made outside the designated landing area, the purpose of which is to support the main landing. (Joint Pub 1-02).

Unity of Command. (1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. (2) Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort--coordination through cooperation and common interests--is an essential complement to unity of command (Joint Pub 3-0).

Significance of Study

Depending on the scheduling of the first exercise to include Amphibious, USMC Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF), and Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) forces, this study will provide an objective review of considerations necessary in the development of the command and control organization. It will provide a close analysis of lessons learned in previous exercises involving MPF elements, add the US Army perspective, and determine potential issues that a Joint Task Force Commander may have to address. With potential issues identified, an authoritative source may be queried to clarify doctrine, dialogue between participants may be

entered, or doctrine might be modified or adapted to specific combat situations.

The US Army stated in FM 100-17-1 that PREPO AFLOAT is "a new evolving mission for the US Army" and as such requires a dedicated and coordinated effort by all Services to obtain success for the supported CINC. Acknowledged is the unique contribution of each service, particularly that of the USMC:

It is important to note that PREPO AFLOAT equipment provides the Combatant Commander a 'reinforcement capability to enhance an established lodgement.' It does not provide the equipment necessary to conduct an amphibious assault operation--a mission of the US Marine Corps.³⁸

A limited study of command and control options, involving three service components, in an academic environment of open dialogue, will produce a dispassionate evaluation of viable options. It is hoped that in the planning stages of a scheduled exercise, this study might be included in the review of lessons learned and recommendations from centers such as the Army Command and General Staff College, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Naval Doctrine Command, and Tactical Training Groups Atlantic and Pacific. The goal of this study is to contribute to the process of improving the joint warfighting capability of the US Armed Forces.

Primary Question to Be Answered

How should a Joint Task Force Commander structure the command and control organization when employing a Naval Expeditionary Force (Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Group/Marine Expeditionary Force, and a Maritime Prepositioning Force) and an Army Prepositioned Afloat Heavy Brigade to reinforce an amphibious assault?

Secondary Questions to Be Answered

1. Are there doctrinal incompatibilities?

2. Are there differences between forces that will allow one or the other component's doctrine to be employed, but not both?
3. What issues resulting from doctrinal perspective will interfere with unity of command?
4. What issues resulting from doctrinal perspective will diminish the economy of effort and/or unity of effort?
5. Are there doctrinal differences that will work against the simplicity principle of war?

Assumptions

1. Any contingency requiring employment of APA will be part of a Joint Task Force.
2. It will require at a minimum a Naval Task Force of 1 or more CVBGs.
3. Amphibious Task Force will be an Amphibious Group and a Marine Expeditionary Force, which will transfer control and authority from Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) to Commander, Landing Force (CLF) ashore.
4. The JFC will be a three star commander, Army or Navy.
5. CATF will be a Naval Officer.
6. Maritime Prepositioning Force operations will consist of at least one Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron.
7. CLF will be a USMC officer conducting an amphibious assault.

Limitations

Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) is a new program, and as such, the amount of material specifically addressing the command and control organization is limited. The prepositioning afloat program has

established lessons learned between USN and USMC operations that are applicable to any operation moving from the sea to establishment of independently operating land forces.

Interim Army Prepositioned Afloat ships have recently deployed and information regarding command and control is classified. Only unclassified information will be included in this study. Somolian lessons learned have recently been declassified and will be used for identification of USN, USMC, and USA interoperability issues.

Some organizational questions, such as, whether to embark USN detachment aboard APA shipping, are still being addressed. Final program structure will probably not be established until delivery of large medium speed roll-on-roll-off (LMSR) units due in FY 1997. This study will consider command and control issues only in the execution stage of an operation and not in the context of routine administrative functions conducted while in homeport.

Army doctrine will not be promulgated before this thesis is completed, but will be probably be in final draft revision. This study will consider the latest draft version as doctrine.

Delimitations

This study will look at only one type of Army Prepositioning Afloat deployment alternative. The thesis will address the command and control organization for integrating the employment of an Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA) force within a Joint Task Force (JTF) that has executed an amphibious operation reinforced immediately by an augmenting Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operation employing one Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON).

Conclusion

This study will consider the Afloat Prepositioning Force as a joint program designed to project combat forces rapidly into theater. While it continues to evolve, the goal is to improve the United States' warfighting ability to insert a credible force during a joint amphibious operation using existing doctrine. US forces should be able to avoid the inefficiency of relearning lessons learned by continuing to develop programs already successful, using proven doctrine, and learning from observations of previous exercises and operations. This study will look at JFC options to organize command and control, in order to project the combat power of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army in an amphibious operation.

Endnotes

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- ³⁴USMC., Operation Restore Hope, 2-A-9 thru 14; CALL, Operation Restore Hope, 5-12.
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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

When the fight starts is not the time to learn how to fight, nor to fight together as a team for the first time--it will only distract you from the more important business of winning. The Army's development of prepositioning afloat is not new. What is new is the shift away from considering afloat prepositioning as a floating warehouse, to that of a method of building immediately upon arrival, a credible combat force from equipment prepositioned afloat. Such employment of Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) equipment has yet to produce a comprehensive study focusing on USN, USMC, and USA command and control issues. The majority of the literature for this study was found in the Joint Publications, Naval Warfare Publications, and Army Field Manuals. After-action reports and lessons learned, submitted after various operations and exercises by the respective services, provided an evaluation of doctrine and identified command and control issues common to joint operations. There were many references to command and control issues in unpublished works found in the Army and Naval War College libraries, although few of these works focused on command and control specifically. They did, however, provide an ability to identify the recurrent joint command and control issues. Finally, there continues to be an increase in articles in periodicals addressing the employment of Army Prepositioning Afloat, some of which discuss issues of command and control. These articles provided a source

of limited scope and depth on the primary question and yield insight into the political sensitivity of the interservice issues of command and control.

Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine publications provide the framework for establishing an armed force organization. Unified Action Armed Forces (Joint Pub 0-2), Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0), Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Joint Pub 5-0), and Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (Joint Pub 5-00.2) give basic guidance to structure a joint command and control organization. Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (Joint Pub 4-0), Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) Operations (Joint Pub 4-03), and Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations (Joint Pub 6-0), each provided a congruent reinforcement of the basic guidance with some specific information on its own special area of interest. The User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning conclusion states, "Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war."¹ Therefore, the guidance and "perspective" found in Joint Pubs was used in this study as a primary source of authoritative information.

Naval Doctrine

Naval Amphibious doctrine began the transition to joint doctrine with the conversion of service specific doctrine, Naval Warfare Publication 22B, Amphibious Operations to Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Joint Pub 3-02) in 1992, and the promulgation of Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation (Joint Pub 3-02.2) in 1993. Service

specific doctrine remains for the use of Military Sealift assets during amphibious operations in Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 22-8, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations. Maritime Prepositioning Force operational doctrine is also covered by a combined NWP/FMFM promulgated by the Naval Doctrine Command under NWP 22-10/FMFM 1-5 dated September 1993.

Army Doctrine

US Army doctrine, "Army Prepositioned Afloat," Field Manual 100-17-1 Draft version four is being developed as a service specific doctrine for conducting prepositioning afloat operations. It currently does not address the command and control organization specifically, rather it merely identifies the need to establish clear command and control lines during each phase of prepositioned afloat operations. It also designates the Army service component commander (ASCC) as the command responsible for ensuring the establishment of a successful command and control organization. It further states there is "no single formula" that can anticipate all the variables of an operation and produce a one-size-fits-all solution to the command and control organization problem. It does, however, outline the broad brush command lines and identifies the CINC issuing the initiating directive as the authority establishing the command relationships.²

Doctrinal Initiative

Commander Surface Warfare Development Group (COMSURFWARDEVGRU) recently issued a tactical memorandum, TM PZ0022-3-94 Maritime Prepositioning Force Command and Control, introducing a shift in thinking away from using amphibious command and control relationships during all maritime prepositioning force augmenting operations. This initiative

represents support of a joint operations philosophy, and new look at the way USN and USMC can work together during non-amphibious operations. It also suggests a trend toward an acceptance of joint doctrinal perspective of supported and supporting relationships, as well as focusing on the military principles of unity of command and simplicity. Perhaps the most promising element is the potential application of the same concept during an Army and Navy prepositioned afloat operation. Although the initiative may have a significant contribution during independent and some types of augmenting operations, its application to a joint amphibious operations does not appear to be valid.

Lessons Learned

The history of Army and Navy amphibious operations provided the first source of command and control issues. Although no actual reinforcements of amphibious assaults by either maritime preposition forces (MPF) or Army prepositioned afloat (APA) have been conducted, the MPF have conducted numerous offloads in support of exercise amphibious landings. Additionally, MPF and the Army preposition shipping out of Diego Garcia and Guam participated in Desert Shield and Restore Hope operations, which provided some valuable lessons learned. Historical operations examined were Operation Torch, Operation Overlord, and Urgent Fury. MPF exercises Ocean Venture 1992 and Ocean Venture 1993 in which the author participated were examined. More recent operations reviewed were Desert Shield, Restore Hope, and the reinforcement of Kuwait by both the MPF and the APA.

Research Methodology

The research was conducted in five phases. During Phase One Joint doctrine was used to establish a doctrinal command and control knowledge base. Employment of Army prepositioned afloat (APA) to reinforce an amphibious operation will be a joint operation, and the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will undoubtedly use Joint doctrine to establish the command and control organization. Phase One identified the doctrine used in a Joint Task Force operation and a Joint Amphibious operation. It also identified service specific doctrine used in amphibious operations, maritime prepositioning force operations, and army prepositioned afloat operations. Also identified during phase one research were initiatives to improve command and control during Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) or Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) operations. The intent in phase one was to summarize what command and control doctrine exists, and the proposed changes to that doctrine. The review of Joint Force Logistics and Joint Logistics Over the Shore doctrine was included during this phase, and commented on when appropriate rather than summarized.

Phase Two researched lessons learned/observations to validate existing doctrine and to identify command and control issues that may impact joint APA operations. Historical joint operations conducted during World War II were reviewed to identify long standing interservice issues. These issues were compared against more recent operations in Grenada, Desert Shield, and Restore Hope. MPF exercise lessons learned were also researched to identify what command and control issues continue to require refinement. Finally, the first employment of APA was considered to identify trends unique to Army and Marine Corps operations where the same concept is being executed.

Phase Three compared MPF operations to APA operations. Doctrine was analyzed to identify similarities and differences in operations that might impact on the command and control organization structure. The intent in Phase Three was to identify doctrinal incompatibilities that would prevent the use of a common command and control organization during a joint operation. Command and control issues identified in Phase Two were also compared against both MPF and APA operations to determine if, in fact, they would be common issues.

Phase Four identified two command and control organization options. Both of the options were then compared against a common set of criteria: unity of command, economy of effort, and simplicity. In the first, the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is the supported commander, and in the second option, the Commander Landing Force (CLF) or the Land Force Component Commander (LFCC) conducting the MPF and APA reinforcement operation is the supported commander. The intent in Phase Four is to narrow the options to the most likely organization that might be established in a joint operation employing Army, Navy, and Marine elements concurrently within the same area of operations.

Phase Five developed conclusions and offers recommendations for consideration when conducting joint Prepositioning Afloat operations to reinforce an amphibious landing. Conclusions drawn from the previous four stages answer the thesis question: What would be the best command and control organization for a CJTF to utilize when conducting a joint MPF/APA operation reinforcing an amphibious landing? The conclusion also justifies why the first option is the best organization, and it explains how it provides the strongest support of the principles of war--unity of command and simplicity. The conclusion also explains why the second

option should not be used during an amphibious operation, and when its unique characteristics might be used due an advantage. Finally, Phase Five makes some overall recommendations to support successful joint operations when conducting a MPF and APA reinforcement of an amphibious landing.

Conclusion

The primary source of literature for this study was doctrine. Both joint doctrine and service specific doctrine was researched to establish an information base from which to review lessons learned. The doctrine for Amphibious operations and Maritime Prepositioning Force augmenting operations was reviewed. Emerging Army Prepositioned Afloat doctrine and a doctrinal change initiative to MPF command and control was analyzed to determine compatibility with Joint and Naval doctrine. The lessons learned were drawn from joint amphibious operations of WWII, the contingency URGENT FURY, and the more recent operations of DESERT SHIELD, RESTORE HOPE and VIGILANT WARRIOR. The lessons learned identified issues from the past which have the potential to affect future operations. A modified historical methodology was used to develop conclusions and recommendations for structuring a Joint Force command and control organization for conducting a reinforcement of an amphibious operation.

Endnotes

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), 29.

²U.S.Army, "FM 100-17-1 Army Prepositioned Afloat," Version 3 Draft (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, no date), 1-6 and 7.

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINE

Joint Pub 1 speaks clearly, just as each great military leader of our nation's past: our US Armed Forces must operate as one to win. An essential element in accomplishing such a philosophy is doctrine. "Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war."¹ As a Naval officer enrolled in a joint curriculum at an Army institution, one sees the Naval perspective toward "doctrine" alluded to as historically different from that of the Army. Because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, and continuing defense program cuts, the US armed forces have developed a genuine joint force orientation. The US Naval force perspective on joint operations participation is dedicated to developing a solid doctrinal foundation based on proven principles of the art of warfare. This author's observations, as part of the teaching staff at the Tactical Training Group Atlantic in Dam Neck Virginia, as a participant in joint exercises Ocean Venture 92 and 93, and as the Chief Staff Officer for Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron One, confirmed that the Naval service actively supports and contributes to the development and use of doctrine. Perhaps Captain Wayne Hughes Jr., USN (Retired), encapsulated the naval perspective best when he wrote in 1986:

Doctrine unites action. It influences and is influenced by training, technology, tactics, and objectives. Doctrine, the instituted set of procedures for combat, should be complied for the

people controlling weapons systems, ships and aircraft, elements of the fleet, and the fleet as a whole. These procedures must be compatible. Doctrine at all levels should be specific, designed to achieve the best results from a united team, but should also allow room for inspired tactics and initiative.

Doctrine standardizes tactics to reduce the laborious planning of individual operations. It is, in effect, generic planning for what can be practiced and trained without knowledge of specific mission contexts.²

In Naval Doctrine Publication 1, signed by General C. E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Admiral F. B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, the naval perspective is officially stated:

Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component of our nation's military strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval Warfare Publications and Fleet Marine Force Manuals. . . . Doctrine guides our actions toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual understanding within and among the Services and the national policy makers.³

In a time of fiscal constraint which reduces training opportunities, it is most likely the US will not have the occasion to practice using the Army Prepositioned Afloat program to reinforce an amphibious assault which has employed a Maritime Prepositioning Force package. This study is focused toward the mutual understanding of doctrine in the joint arena, which will unite the actions of the Navy, Marine, and Army elements involved in the employment of prepositioned equipment afloat. The objective is plan now, without the "specific mission contexts;" so when called to fight as a team, the "laborious planning of individual operations" might be reduced to essential efforts only. This chapter will first summarize doctrine which might be used in afloat prepositioned force operations: current joint doctrine, draft army doctrine, and a recent tactical initiative. Secondly, it will consider some lessons learned and observations made from both World War II amphibious operations and some more recent operations involving the joint employment of Army and Naval forces. Next, a comparison between the Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Army

Prepositioned Afloat program doctrines will be made. Finally, this chapter will describe two methods of structuring the command and control organization for a naval expeditionary force conducting an amphibious assault employing prepositioned equipment afloat.

Joint Doctrine

CINCs use deliberate planning to address potential threats and organize forces in consensus with the principles of war so that during execution, the synergistic application of resources will win. With this methodology they are able to wed the use of military force to the diplomatic instrument of power and accomplish the national security strategic objectives. Commanders use Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, to begin developing a common perspective toward warfighting.

Identified are,

[the] aims of command organization. The mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained in the accomplishment of the mission are the two most fundamental considerations in the establishment of command organization.⁴

The command and control organization eventually established must support the basic concepts of unity of effort, centralized direction, decentralized execution, common doctrine, and interoperability.⁵ Joint Pub 0-2 continues to define terms and principles and to explain relationships, all of which develops a foundation that will be built upon in further doctrinal publications.

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations focuses on guidance to the Joint Force Commander, using the foundation established by JP 0-2. Many of the terms and principles defined in JP 0-2 are contained verbatim in JP 3-0. They are expanded on and the clarification provided begins to clearly identify potential applications in current military operations. While JP 0-2 goes into detail regarding the various command and control

options available in organizing armed forces, JP 3-0 summarizes the Joint Force Commander (JFC) role, explaining the JFC's relationship to the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war. Though the JFC is more readily associated with the warfighting element of "joint operations," the conduct of battle at the operational and tactical level, he is also responsible for the "unified action" of the forces under his command. JP 3-0 defines the concept of unified action as "the synchronized application of all the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organization as well as military forces."⁶ JFC synchronization is both up (NCA and CINC), and down (subordinate CJFs) the chain of command.

The JFC is where strategic meets operational. The JFC is also where operational considerations begin to influence the tactical mission. JFC's contribution in organizing the elements of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps team is essential to conducting a successful amphibious assault reinforced by afloat prepositioning assets. Figure 1 shows the potential components of a joint force.⁷ Service components are included to fulfill logistic and training responsibilities, and to support JFC's unity of command with service expertise. Major K. Scott Lawrence, USAF, has pointed out:

A JFC normally names a single air, land, and sea commander to control forces fighting in their respective media Justifying unity of command along service component lines is primarily based on the concept of inherent expertise. It is thought that to fully exploit the combat potential of a service, forces must remain under a single component commander who is specifically trained to employ forces in a given medium. Since service component lines--or the medium in which they are employed--are not objectives, they should not be the primary criterion by which unity of operational command is established.⁸




Figure 1. Possible Components in a Joint Force

Figure 1 illustrates the continuation of "service component lines" and the "concept of inherent expertise" through use of Land, Air, and Maritime Component commanders. Joint forces utilize two separate chain of command channels, one operational NCA to JFC, and the second administrative, parent command to Service component. The JFC has a number of options available in organizing assigned forces (as detailed in JP 0-2) to design a force with maximum effectiveness at the tactical level. He may establish subordinate Joint Task Forces and Task Forces, and Functional Component Commanders.⁹

Important influences on the tactical success of operations are the supporting and supported relationships the JFC establishes between the various components, using the principles and standards put forth in JP 0-2 and JP 3-0. Use of the JP 0-2 guidance on exercise of support will eliminate coordination difficulties and facilitate resolution cooperation issues.¹⁰ JP 3-0 quotes JP 0-2, paragraph, 3-17 in providing the definition and guidance on the supporting and supported relationship. The support relationship is determined to be necessary and is established by a superior commander, usually common to both the supported and the supporting commander. JFCs in establishing support relationships will normally follow the joint doctrine which states:

As defined in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort." General direction includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take such action to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

The establishing directive indicates the purpose in terms of the effect desired and the scope of the action to be taken. It should include:

- (a) The strength of forces allocated to the supporting mission.
- (b) The time, place, and duration of the supporting effort.
- (c) The priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.
- (d) The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting mission in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
- (e) The general or special authority for any operational or other instructions to be issued by the forces being supported or by other authority in the action areas.¹¹

General Shalikashvili states in his introductory remarks to the User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning, that planners must now include a more detailed explanation of not only "what forces to deploy and when to

deploy them" and also the reasoning for how and why they are being used. Additionally, in order to ensure our successful execution as a joint warfighting team, all "future plans must incorporate to the maximum extent possible the warfighting employment principles outlined in joint doctrine; Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-0 (Joint Operations, and Planning for Joint Operations, respectively)." ¹²

Naval Amphibious Doctrine

Naval amphibious operations are conducted using Joint Pub 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. The amphibious assault, the landing of power projection forces from "an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power," ¹³ requires fully developed teamwork. Once the National Command Authority determines the requirement to use military forces to accomplish its strategic objectives, the geographic CINC will organize assigned forces as necessary to ensure operations obtain strategic success. When organizing an amphibious task force as a joint force, the task force will be organized and command relationships will follow the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF) and Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. This guidance allows maximum flexibility for the CINC to establish numerous operational organizations tailored to his specific operational strategy.

The specifics of task organization are dependant on the Service mix of forces, and the individual preference of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). When employing such a national treasure, the need is obvious for a clear command relationship that focuses unity of command from the President to the field. Because of the complex nature of such a large operation, there is an exceptional need for "unity of effort and operational coherence" to be maintained through the three levels of

warfare. The President establishes the strategic objective. The CINC merges the operational to the strategic via the JFC. The JFC welds the operational to the tactical via the CATF and the CLF, who ensures each battle/engagement directly supports the strategic purpose for which the operation was initiated. Amphibious doctrine is designed to fuse the various elements participating in the operation into an efficient and effective team that can transition the embarked combat power at sea to a force able to provide sustained warfare on land in support of a JFC's operational objectives. Figure 2 shows one alternative for arranging command relationships during an amphibious operation.¹⁴




Figure 2. Possible Amphibious Command and Control

The JFC and his staff play a vital role in establishing the organization that will transition through the various phases of an amphibious operation: planning, embarkation, movement rehearsal, and assault. Critical to successful operations employing amphibious forces are the communications amongst the force that will participate in the assault and subsequent operations. The JFC ensures the commands participating are focused, unity of command is established, and economy of effort and simplicity are maintained as the operational plans are developed. Some of the responsibilities of the JFC and his staff include finding ways to resource those short-falls identified by the CATF that are critical to assault success but are beyond the capabilities of the ATF. This may include, but is not limited to strategic intelligence from national sensors, and neutralization of threats identified by the CATF, which are outside of the amphibious objective area (AOA) yet may interfere with an assault. The JFC will also cause supporting operations, which may be required, to be fully coordinated with and through the CATF. JFC will also ensure any "nonamphibious operations" within the AOA are fully synchronized with CATF. As the Commander to whom all forces report, the JFC will be the adjudicating authority between CATF and CLF for issues that cannot be agreed upon during the planning phase when they are coequal, and between CATF and commanders, not OPCON to CATF. The JFC will provide guidance and direction to forces involved in the amphibious operations in the "Initiating Directive" sent to the CATF.¹⁵

The "Initiating Directive" contributes to the success of an amphibious operation by providing critical information to the various participants. It is an "order to CATF to conduct an amphibious operation."¹⁶ The use of Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures and the

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) may on occasion transmit various parts of the initiating directive in its several orders: the warning order, alert order, planning order, and execute order.¹⁷ This method supports a rapid reaction requirement, as was seen during Desert Shield, when amphibious forces commenced movement toward the crisis area before being assigned a specific mission. The doctrinal phasing of an amphibious assault--planning, embarkation, movement, rehearsal, and assault--was modified to embark and move prior to planning. When the amphibious assault is the keystone of a campaign plan, however, the "Initiating Directive" generally is a singular document issued at the beginning of an operation as an order to CATF to conduct an assault.

Joint Pub 3-02 identifies the following as critical elements of the "Initiating Directive."

- (1) Establishes the ATF.
- (2) Assigns a mission.
- (3) Provides forces to accomplish the mission.
- (4) Assigns assault shipping for both assault echelon (AE) and assault follow-on echelon.
- (5) Designates CATF, CLF, and other commanders as appropriate.
- (6) Positively defines the AOA in terms land, and air space. The size must be sufficient to ensure accomplishment of the ATF mission as well as to provide sufficient area for the conduct of necessary air, land, and sea operations.
- (7) Provides code words for the operation name and for other key specifics about the operation.
- (8) Sets target dates for execution of the operations.
- (9) Provides special instructions on command relationships.
- (10) Provides special instructions pertaining to the planning, employment, allocation, and control of nuclear and chemical munitions.
- (11) Includes:
 - (a) Positive instructions governing the termination of the operation and, if feasible, command arrangements and disposition of forces to be effective at that time.

(b) Information regarding operations to be conducted after termination of the amphibious operation.

(12) Assigns responsibility and provides necessary coordination instructions for the conduct of supporting operations.

(13) Provides cryptographic and OPSEC guidance.

(14) Provides a concept for military deception operations to be conducted in support of the amphibious operations.

(15) Provides other information considered necessary.¹⁸

A JFC, using the guidance on supporting/supported relationships in Joint Pub 0-2 and the information provided in Joint Pub 3-02 on content of the initiating directive, will establish the most favorable command climate in which the disparate commands may develop the level of teamwork necessary to achieve success.

Doctrinal Role of the CATF

The Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), whether landing Marines (a single service operation) or soldiers (a joint amphibious task force (JATF)), will be a Navy officer. It is the necessity of unity of command that drives the selection of a Navy officer. From the planning phase through embarkation and movement to the rehearsal area, the command, control, and coordination requirements become the responsibility of the CATF embarked on the amphibious flag ship. The complex nature of an amphibious assault, the susceptibility to multiple threats en route and in the vicinity of the amphibious objective area (AOA), demands an extraordinary degree of oversight in order to maintain unity of effort. Through exceptionally clear, concise, and unambiguous command lines, the CATF brings to bear the hallmarks of amphibious operations--mobility and flexibility. The CATF is responsible for assembling the power projection forces, and for moving from the sea through the tenuous condition of zero combat power ashore, to a fully capable fighting force able to prosecute

subsequent combat operations deep into enemy terrain. Unity of command in the CATF provides the framework to effectively transition each phase of the operation and merge the strategic level of the NCA/CINC through the operational level of the JFC/CATF to the tactical level of the CATF/CLF.

Every action, and each relationship established, focuses national efforts to ensure successful transition from the sea to the full combat power established ashore. When the need for an amphibious operation becomes apparent, an Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU One or Two) will commence opening communication channels with known participants the operation. Prior to promulgation of an initiating order the CATF acts as the coordinating agent for the commander who will be overall responsible for the campaign. The CINC may retain this responsibility, or he may delegate the authority to issue the initiating directive to a Service component commander, a functional component commander, or Joint Force Commander. Once the Initiating Directive is issued the planning phase commences, and unique command relationships are engaged to facilitate preparation for the operations. CATF's coordination responsibilities continue with all commanders assigned to the operations being coequal in planning. Joint Pub 3-02 explains:

These planning relationships are designed to ensure that both naval and LF [landing force] considerations are adequately factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of the amphibious operations. . . . All decisions must be reached on a basis of common understanding of the mission, objectives, and procedures and on a free exchange of information. Any differences between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to their superior in the operational chain of command."¹⁹

Normally this common superior will be the authority issuing the Initiating Directive and approving the operational plans of the amphibious force. During the planning phase, the open free flow of information ensures the plans developed realize the full capabilities, limitations and unique

characteristic of the units involved. This understanding of service specific expertise during planning, reduces the friction of war and the chance of unfavorable developments during execution. Upon approval of the amphibious assault plan, embarkation and movement phases commence. Planning continues as necessary to refine and adjust to enemy situation. Upon embarkation of the Landing Forces, CATF receives OPCON of assigned forces and assumes full responsibility for successful execution of the approved operational plan. Should a significant change in the enemy situation take place, or the assigned mission change to the extent a modification of the operational plan is required, the coequal relationship during planning is again established. This is also the case when the embarkation of forces and their movement to an area of operation happens prior to receipt of a mission or formal initiating directive. This is most probable when reacting to a crisis situation. Coequal planning is also a matter of routine in forward deployed Amphibious Readiness Groups.

Within the amphibious objective area (AOA), during execution of an amphibious operation, the CATF is invested with "specific authority, as prescribed by the commander having overall authority for the operation."²⁰ The module of centralized planning/decentralized execution is followed during amphibious operations. The CATF executes the approved plan, exercising authority through the commanders of the task organizations established by the JFC. These commanders execute the missions approved and coordinated through the CATF. When a force is operating in the AOA, but is not a part of the amphibious task force, specific guidance is usually included in the initiating directive as to the command and control relationship that shall exist. If no guidance is included in the initiating directive, the standard will be the same as it is for forces

transiting the AOA: "control will be exercised only to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference and in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2 regarding support by transient forces under emergency conditions."²¹

The CATF ensures the principle of unity of command is effectively applied during all phases, but most importantly, during the assault phase as the force transitions from the sea to the establishment of a fully integrated fighting force ashore. The purpose is to avoid confusion and activities that might interfere with the various unit-level operations requiring close coordination. The CATF and his staff organization is the mechanism through which the force synchronization occurs. The CATF is usually the only Navy commander that exercises authority over or assumes responsibility for operation of Landing Force units and Air Force units. The only exception to this occurs when CATF establishes subordinate commanders whose organization composites both Navy and Landing Force or Air Force units. Such a decision is made during the planning phase in consultation with appropriate Landing Force or Air Force commanders.²²

The CATF in maintaining unity of effort is supported by the various commanders who use their own separate chains of command. CATF will organize Navy elements into task groups as required by the operational situation. Joint Pub 3-02 provides the following list of potential task groups that may be found in an amphibious operation:

- Transportation Group(s)
- Control Group(s)
- Tactical Air Control Group
- Surface Fire Support Group(s)
- Tactical Air Group(s) (shore-based)
- Carrier Battle Group(s)
- Screening Group(s)
- Mine Warfare Group
- Reconnaissance and Special Warfare Group
- Tactical Deception Group
- Inshore Undersea Group

Maritime Patrol Air Group
Air Transport Group
Naval Beach Group
Electronic Warfare Group²³

The CATF will normally conduct operations exercising OPCON of the transport, control, and tactical air control groups. Command relationships of other task groups are usually addressed in the initiating directive. At a minimum the CATF will exercise TACON of elements operating inside the AOA. If augmentation shipping is required it will be either assigned in the initiating directive or provided through Navy and US Transportation Command channels in response to CATF requests. The units provided from common-user shipping are then integrated into the ATF following the guidance contained in Naval Warfare Publication 22-8, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.²⁴ The CLF will organize the Landing Force elements into one of three basic functional formats depending on the phase of amphibious operation: organization for embarkation, organization for landing, and basic tactical organization. The final organization for combat operations will be considered throughout embarkation and landing in order to achieve full combat striking power as rapidly as possible upon landing.²⁵

Just as the task group commanders maintain a free flow of information between themselves and CATF, so do the various parallel chains of command. The demand for detailed, parallel, and concurrent planning is consistent throughout all phases and levels of an amphibious operation.

As identified in Amphibious doctrine:

Commanders at all levels are required to maintain close and continuous relationships to ensure that, except in emergencies, no commander makes decisions affecting corresponding commanders without consultation. In such cases the commander making an emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of his action at the earliest practicable time.²⁶

The same principle applies to their chains of command. "All necessary orders from one commander affecting personnel under command of a corresponding commander at a parallel level of command are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate counterpart commander."²⁷ This principle is applied at the CATF/CLF level as well. When CATF issues an order to a subordinate Navy commander whose unit consists of both Navy and Landing Force elements, doctrinal guidance says, "Whenever CATF issues an order to such subordinate commanders that affects the corresponding LF element, CLF will be informed and consulted before the order is issued."²⁸

Amphibious doctrine describes other forces, separate and distinct from amphibious assault forces which may be identified in the initiating directive, as:

[Forces] temporarily assigned or attached to the ATF for planning and conduct of special tasks such as those associated with garrison and base development, civil-military operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), special operations, and liaison with US Government and host-nation civil authorities. Other commanders, so designated in the initiating directive, will participate in planning and coordinating their participation in the amphibious operation. As appropriate, CLF provides for embarking and landing these forces and assisting, as directed, the initiation of assigned tasks as permitted by the operational situation.²⁹

The assault phase continues until mission completion. Termination and subsequent tasking is determined by the authority issuing the initiating directive. Normally, one of the basic requirements of termination is that the landing force is in control of a specified sector ashore. There are four doctrinal measurements of establishing a landing force ashore:

- (1) The beachhead is secured.
- (2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces are established ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations.
- (3) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities are established ashore.

(4) CLF is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.³⁰

Transfer of control usually takes place in phases as combat power is built up ashore. CATF and CLF will complete the transfer of control of combat capability ashore to the LF elements. Once CATF and CLF concur that CLF has in fact the ability to operate independently, and that all ATF missions have been accomplished, then CATF will report such to the authority who issued the initiating directive, or the commander so designated to receive such report. This authority, or authority designated, will then execute any special instructions contained in the initiating directive and/or "terminate the amphibious operation, disestablish the AOA, dissolve the ATF, and provide additional instructions, as required, to include command arrangements and disposition of forces."³¹ One of the possible other forces may be a USMC Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) or an Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) force.

Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations

There are two types of Maritime Prepositioning Force operations, independent and augmenting. An MPF MAGTF conducts Independent MPF operation that does not become a part of another USMC force. Augmentation operations conversely fulfill the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, and "is the transfer of forces to the operational command of a supported commander during execution of an operation." Naval Warfare Pub 22-10/Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-5 identifies augmentation as operations in which the MPF MAGTF is subsumed by, or integrated into, a MARFOR or ATF in the objective area.³² This overview of MPF will consider only the command and control relationships related to an augmentation MPF operation reinforcing an ATF. It will consider first the traditional relationships contained in Naval

service doctrine NWP 22-11. Secondly, it will summarize a tactical memorandum under development by Naval Surface Warfare Development Group.

A MPF operation is complimentary to an amphibious operation. They have the same hallmarks of flexibility and mobility. A MPF operation does not have a forcible entry capability, but requires a relatively secure area that will allow the arrival of equipment via ship, and personnel via aircraft, to off-load equipment and be joined with personnel into combat task organizations. This happens in the arrival and assembly phase of a MPF operation and is the transition from deployment to employment. When MPF units commence tactical combat operations, they are no longer considered part of the MPF operation.³³ Although there is no generic formula to incorporate an MPF into an ATF, the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures of both MPF and amphibious operations are mutually supportable. The principles of war--unity of command and simplicity are supported through this use of standardized terminology and concepts.³⁴

NWP 22-10, chapter 3, Operational Planning, the responsibility for command and control is discussed. Preparation for deployment and employment of MPF will use the JOPES' deliberate and crisis planning methods. Once the NCA determines the use of MPF necessary, the supported CINC establishes an organization appropriate to the specific situation.

Joint Pub states:

Higher authority will establish command relationship to minimize disruption of command and control of MPF operations during the transition from planning through deployment and execution phases. Supported and supporting CINCs will include command relationships in their operations directives. Fleet commanders will designate CMPF and define relationships within the initiating directive. CMPF will ensure that relationships are established within the force, and recommend additions/changes for external relations as required.³⁵

As alluded to earlier there is no one-size-fits-all organization that will encompass the many varied operational and tactical situations a commander might encounter. The command prerogatives of the Combatant Commander and his war fighters allow for maximum flexibility in execution of their operational art to accomplish the national strategic objectives. The CINC will exercise his combatant command authority in accordance with Joint doctrine to establish the best mix of forces to respond to the specific situation.³⁶

At the operational level of war the Joint Force Commander will receive support from his component commanders (see fig 1 for possible components in a joint force). In conducting a MPF amphibious augmentation operation there are four primary participants which will form the Navy Marine Corps team: Commander Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF)/Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF); Commanding General Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)/Commander Landing Force (CLF); Commander Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (COMPSRON); and Commander Navy Support Element (CNSE).

Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force, is a USN officer designated in the initiating directive who receives OPCON of MAGTF, NSE, and MPSRON. During independent operations, CMPF fulfills the function of CATF in coordinating the transition from the sea to land operations. When reinforcing an amphibious operation, the CMPF functions/responsibilities are subsumed by the CATF. Normal practice is for an Amphibious Group Commander to be designated as CATF/CMPF when MEF (FWD) or MEF sized amphibious operations are anticipated.³⁷

Commanding General, Marine Air Ground Task Force, is a USMC officer responsible for Marine Corps forces. During independent

operations the MAGTF commander maintains traditional CATF/CLF relationship to CMPF. When reinforcing an amphibious operation, the MAGTF commander responsibilities are subsumed by the CLF. Normal practice is for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commanding General to be designated as CLF/CG MAGTF or MARFOR Commander when conducting a MEF(FWD) or MEF sized amphibious assault.³⁸

Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron, is a U.S. Navy officer exercising TACON of the MPS squadron of ships. Embarked on the MPSRON flagship he reports OPCON to the CATF. Primarily responsible for ship movement and positioning for off loading as directed by CATF, he is also responsible for coordinating activities between the MAGTF and NSE onboard squadron ships. COMPSRON establishes or augments the local Military Sealift Command Office (MSCO) when MPS off-load is completed and the ships have returned to the common user pool for continued use as a strategic lift asset.³⁹

Commander, Navy Support Element, is a Navy officer normally from Naval Beach Group (NBG) who commands elements from NBG, Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group (NAVCHAPGRU), and other navy elements that may be assigned to conduct the off-load. CNSE exercises OPCON over MAGTF debarkation teams provided to conduct the off-load, and coordinates the activities between the Navy Beach Party elements and the Landing Force Shore Party elements.

The MPF is a temporary organization established to deploy a MAGTF. An MPF operation deployment consists of four distinct phases: planning, marshaling, movement, and arrival and assembly. Command relationships will differ in each phase of an MPF operation. As is the case in an amphibious operation, the most significant document in the process of

deployment and employment of a MPF MAGTF is the initiating directive.

When the MPF operation augments an amphibious operation, the necessary guidance is included in the amphibious operations initiating directive.

NWP 22-10 discusses items that should be included in the MPF initiating directive. It should include, but is not limited to the following items of information:

1. The purpose for the MPF deployment and employment.
2. Designation of CMPF, if not previously designated.
3. Command relationships during planning, marshaling, movement to the objective area, arrival and assembly, and subsequent operations.
4. Required date for the completion of MPF operations.
5. General location of the AAA and ultimate MAGTF area of operation.
6. Availability of US/Allied support in the objective area or from other theaters, to include fleet operations for tactical security/defense.
7. Estimated closure time of the MPSRON to the AAA.
8. Availability of Navy and Marine forces.
9. Identification of AMC planning headquarters.
10. Logistics instructions regarding support responsibilities in the objective area.
11. Instructions regarding employment of the MPSRON and NSE at the conclusion of the arrival and assembly phase.
12. Communication instructions.
13. Operations security/defense guidance.⁴⁰

NWP 22-10 further identifies the Fleet Commander-in-Chief (FLTCINC)/ Naval Component Commander as responsible for issuing the initiating directive issuing, or delegating the task to a subordinate numbered fleet commander with the responsibility to promulgate it.⁴¹ The initiating directive will normally be issued by the commander who is overall responsible for the operation: Combatant Commander (CINC), Joint Force Commander (JFC), or Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). Joint and Naval

doctrine are congruent and support the CINC's responsibility to produce the most appropriate force tailored to the specific situation.

The following discussion of phases as illustrated by the accompanying figures, summarize the generic command and control organizational plan as outlined in NWP 22-10, that will bring the MAGTF deployment to an efficient conclusion, and facilitate a quick transition to the MAGTF employment phase of the JFC's combat plan. Each phase is identified by the predominant activity. There will be overlapping of phase activity, as in the case of the planning phase, which continues throughout all phases.

Figure 3 illustrates the relationships during the MPF planning phase. The planning phase is initiated by a warning order or tasking by the appropriate immediate senior in the chain of command (ISIC) to




Figure 3. MPF Planning Phase

coordinate planning efforts. Planning for an MPF augmentation operation or reinforcement of an amphibious operation will be conducted under CATF/CLF co-equal status. COMPSRON, NBG, and MAGTF staffs coordinate actions with tasking issued through the numbered fleet commander that they are normally OPCON to. Planning commences upon notification of pending operations, with detail, concurrent and parallel planning upon receipt of the initiating directive.⁴²

Figure 4 illustrates the relationships during the MPF marshaling phase. Marshaling phase commences upon arrival of the first unit at one of the assigned marshaling points. The phase continues until the last unit deploys from the departure airfield. CATF and CLF have both subsumed




Figure 4. MPF Marshaling Phase

their respective CMPF/CG MAGTF functions/responsibilities. CLF

coordinates the majority of airlift, while CATF coordinates sealift activities.⁴³

Figure 5 illustrates the relationships during the MPF movement phase. Movement phase overlaps the marshaling phase, and commences as the first element leave the departure airfield en route to the arrival and assembly area. It considered complete when the last MPS unit or the last




Figure 5. MPF Movement Phase

fly in echelon aircraft arrives at their respective port. Movement of the organization to the arrival and assembly area is normally divided into separate groups. CG MAGTF as delegated by CATF controls the air deployment referred to as the Fly in Echelon (FIE). CATF retains responsibility for sealift control, and coordinates that movement through the fleet commander. Airlifted units are the off-load and preparation party; survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party; advance party; main body; and the self-deploying aircraft of the flight ferry. Because of

sequencing into an ongoing operation, the amphibious assault, ADCON coordination efforts between appropriate staffs becomes critically important. Final movement of the MPF units will occur after the lodgement has been established by successful amphibious assault. Coordination occurs between COMPSRON, CNSE, MAGTF to integrate elements to facilitate a rapid transition through the arrival and assembly phase.⁴⁴

Figure 6 illustrates the relationships during the MPF arrival and assembly phase. Timing airlift and sealift arrival is the critical element in avoiding congestion which inhibits the joining of equipment with forces, and establishment of combat ready forces ready for immediate




Figure 6. MPF Arrival and Assembly Phase

employment. As discussed in the above paragraph this phase begins with the arrival of first ship or aircraft. It ends when the CLF/CG MAGTF reports to CATF that all MAGTF combat elements are ready to commence subsequent tactical operations. Arrival and assembly responsibilities are

divided into functional areas. CATF/CMPF exercising OPCON over all elements, is responsible for successful arrival and assembly of all forces. CNSE supports with accomplishing ship to shore movement of equipment and off loading of ships, either pierside or over open beaches. CLF/CG MAGTF is responsible to organize reception to join units arriving from both seaport and airport. Coordination continues between COMPSRON, CNSE, and CLF to effect the transition from deployment to employment in the minimum amount of time.⁴⁵

The MPF operation is considered terminated when the last unit of the MAGTF is ready for combat. Depending on the MAGTF scheme of maneuver, units may transition from deployment to employment prior to the completion of the arrival and assembly phase. The initiating directive or appropriate authority will provide detailed guidance on the command and control for subsequent operations. During augmentation operations the MPF MAGTF reinforces another force and becomes part of one of the following: MARFOR under CLF, MARFOR component for a Joint Force Land Component Commander, or as a component of a task force of the numbered fleet commander.⁴⁶

Doctrinal Initiative

Commander, Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG), Norfolk Virginia, issued a Tactical Memorandum (TACMEMO) which addresses the Maritime Prepositioning Force Command and Control doctrine from a different perspective. The SWDG Tactical Memorandum is the first step toward changing Naval doctrine as indicated in its purpose paragraph and its doctrinal statement. This TACMEMO proposes "experimental baseline tactics that establish the preferred beginning point for the tactical commander. Tactical commanders will use experimental baseline tactics to

build the tactical innovation necessary for success in naval warfighting."⁴⁷ The TACMEMO will undergo a period of informal and formal evaluation. After this evaluation period, and if validated, the TACMEMO and information learned during evaluation, will be used to update NWP 22-10, OH 1-5-1 Tri-MEF Maritime Prepositioning Force Standing Operating Procedures, and SWDG TACMEMO PZ0022-1-93/OH 1-5-2, MPF Checklists, as appropriate.⁴⁸

The TACMEMO reverses the traditional roles of CATF and CLF and establishes CG MAGTF as the supported commander and Commander Navy Supporting Force as a supporting commander. Four factors are cited as making a case for changing the command and control relationships:

- a. Maturation of the program - great deal of experience has been gained from operations and training exercises.
- b. Application of joint warfighting techniques following Operation Desert Storm greater emphasis has been placed on the complementary nature of combined operations.
- c. Rising importance of expeditionary and littoral warfare - the majority of current crises the United States has responded to have taken place in the world's littoral regions.
- d. Disestablishment of standing MPF Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) - responsibility for USMC portion of MPF planning and execution has shifted from the MEB to the MEFs and Marine Forces LANT/PAC.⁴⁹

The TACMEMO further presents three rationale identified as both "theoretical and practical," as supportive of the proposed change.

It argues that current doctrine violates the principle of unity of command. The purpose of MPF is to arrive early in the crisis to provide a credible force. In today's environment this translates as support to a Joint Task Force commander. The assumption is the MAGTF will arrive in the AAA, and prior to completion of the arrival phase, commence tactical maneuvers in support of the JFC. The rationale for change is the MAGTF

commander is working for two commanders, the CATF/CMPF and the JFC, which works against the principle of unity of command.⁵⁰

It suggests current doctrine violates the common sense test. CMPF's true mission is in reality a supporting role to the MAGTF. The MAGTF commander is the commander employing combat forces, and is therefore the commander receiving support.⁵¹

The TACMEMO argues, if current doctrine does not support unity of command, and does not accurately reflect support relationships, it will create confusion and does not support the principle of simplicity. Throughout the four phases of an MPF operation the command and control organization should be maintained and the transition from phase to phase be seamless. Operational control belongs to the supported commander in order to provide the necessary unity of command to ensure mission success. The TACMEMO asserts, "The MAGTF commander is presently responsible for the vast majority of the MPF operation without the total requisite authority over forces necessary to influence its outcome."⁵²

Recommended changes to the current doctrine can be briefly summarized by phase. The changes do not impact the shape of the organization as depicted in figures 3 thru 6. Only the OPCON relationship between the CMPF and MAGTF CDR appears to have changed. The TACMEMO identifies the common commander and the issuing of the initiating directive as necessary elements of implementing the recommended changes. Essential responsibilities remain the same with the exception of MAGTF commander promulgating the Arrival and Assembly Plan instead of CMPF. In the Marshaling phase rather than CMPF delegating the airlift to the MAGTF CDR, he assumes that responsibility. No change is identified in the movement phase, the sealift portion is accomplished via numbered fleet

commander and Commander Navy Support Force (CNSF), and the airlift portion is accomplished via USCINCTrans and MAGTF CDR. The arrival and assembly phase remains separated between sealift arrival, off-load and assembly; and airlift arrival and assembly. The same coordination requirements/procedures remain between the COMPSRON, NSE, and MAGTF CDR and are not modified or changed by shifting the supported supporting relationship.⁵³

The principles of unity of command and simplicity are facilitated by the assignment of the MPF MAGTF commander as the supported commander, when conducting independent and augmenting operations other than the reinforcement of an amphibious assault. Responsibilities for security suggests a more complex command and control organization when conducting a reinforcement of an amphibious operation: "Responsibility for security of Naval forces (USN/USMC) rest with their common commander, who may either be the CINC, JTF commander, or CATF."⁵⁴ In the absence of information addressing the recommendation of changing the doctrinal relationship of CATF and CLF during an amphibious assault, the assumption is made this TACMEMO does recommend changing amphibious doctrine. If the traditional CATF/CLF relationship is maintained during the planning and execution of an amphibious assault, then to introduce a change to the MPF reinforcement phase of a JFC's campaign would seriously violate both principles of unity of command and simplicity. If however, the MPF reinforcement phase is separated from the amphibious assault by sufficient time, that is amphibious operations have been terminated, then the recommended command and control relationship in this TACMEMO might be prudent.

Army Prepositioned Afloat Draft Doctrine

In response to DOD Mobility Requirement Study (MRS) signed in January 1992, the Army developed the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP). The task of the ASMP was to upgrade the Army's contribution to the existing Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF). PREPO ships are 13 ships sponsored by USA (4), USAF (4), Defense Logistic Agency (4), and one hospital ship. The USA loads its four ships with prepositioned ammo, Class I, II, and VIII supplies, and port handling and combat hospital equipment. Twelve of these ships are ported at Guam and Diego Garcia, while one, MV Advantage, is stationed in the Mediterranean.

Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) are eight converted Large Medium Speed Roll on/Roll off (LMSR) ships carrying a heavy brigade. APA has incorporated the Army PREPO ships and is now referred to as APA or PREPO Afloat. All ships are currently ported at Guam and Diego Garcia. The ASMP has the following capability objectives:

1. Interim fix will use eight LMSR and one LASH, to preposition a Heavy Brigade afloat with 30 days of supplies, able to establish a combat ready force by C+15. Target dates for program implementation: 1994 Interim/1997 endstate.

2. Ability to deploy 2 heavy divisions (surge) from CONUS using 11 LMSRs and 8 Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), able to establish a combat ready force by C+30. Target dates for program implementation: 1998 interim/2002 endstate.

3. Ability to deploy 5 heavy divisions from CONUS using 20 LMSRs 8 FSS and 36 RRF RO/RO by C+75. Target date for program implementation: 2002.⁵⁵

In order to provide this capability, USA has organized equipment into force modules A thru D:

Module "A" - Full Port Support Operations for Major Regional Contingencies

Capability: Deploys one airborne division via air insertion, two heavy divisions, and one heavy brigade with requisite support slice, by PREPO AFLOAT ships (11 Large, Medium speed Roll on/Roll off (LMSR) and 8 Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), with an earliest arrival date of C+4 and a latest arrival date of C+19.

This provides full terminal service capability to open air and seaports, making it possible to discharge all PREPO AFLOAT ships and surge sealift ships by C+30; full inland support capability; and provide full intra theater sealift.

Module "B" - Limited Port Support Operations for Lesser Regional Contingencies.

Capability: Deploys one airborne division via air insertion, one heavy brigade with requisite support slice, by PREPO AFLOAT ships (8 LMSR and 1 Lighterage Aboard Ship (LASH)), with an earliest arrival date of C+4 and a latest arrival date of C+9.

This provides adequate terminal service to open air and seaports and to discharge four LMSRs by C+15, plus selective discharge of other PREPO AFLOAT ships; enhanced inland support capability; and enhanced intra theater sealift.

Module "C" - Minimum Port Support Operations for Major Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Missions.

Capability: Deploys one airborne division via air insertion, two heavy battalions with requisite support slice, by PREPO AFLOAT ships (4-9 LMSR ships), with an earliest arrival date of C+4.

This provides adequate terminal service to open air and seaports and to discharge two LMSRs by C+15, plus selective discharge of other PREPO ships; limited inland support capability; and limited intra theater sealift.

Module "D" - Initial Port Opening Support for Small Humanitarian Missions.

Capability: Deploys one airborne division via air insertion, one heavy battalion task force with requisite support slice, by PREPO AFLOAT ships (3-5 ships), with an earliest arrival date of C+4.

This provides adequate terminal service to open air and seaports, and to discharge one LMSR by C+10, plus selective discharge of other PREPO ships; initial port clearance capability and links into defense transportation system; and limited intra theater sealift.⁵⁶

By the year 2002, the ASMP intends to realize a five division-Corps options capability anywhere in the world using 20 LMSRs, 8 FSS, and 36 Ready Reserve Force (RRF) RO/RO ships. COMSC Washington D.C. let contracts for 14 LMSRs in September of 1993.⁵⁷

FM 100-17-1, "Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA)," describes the APA requirement in response to the ASMP:

The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) Action Plan published 2 March 1993 in response to the DOD Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) of January 1992, stated the U. S. Army will develop the capability to provide a crisis response force of up to corps size with the following mobility standards:

- A light or airborne, brigade-sized force to be inserted into a theater by C+4, with the remainder of that division to close not later than C+12. This force, including its personnel and equipment and logistical support structure, would be transported largely by air.

- An afloat heavy combat brigade with support (PREPO AFLOAT) to close into the theater and be ready to fight not later than C+15. The PREPO

AFLOAT brigade force would be a 2x2 heavy brigade (two armored and two mechanized battalions, plus support). This force would be organized into force modules, tailoring them to meet the CINC's needs.

- By C+30 two heavy divisions (a mix of mechanized infantry, armored, or, air assault forces, depending on the theater commander's priorities) to include the logistical support structure would close in theater. The equipment for the heavy force would transit by sea.
- The remaining force (two divisions and support) would close by C+75.
- Air transport would be the preferred mode of travel for all contingency force personnel.⁵⁸

Interesting note: the first two missions delineated are, "augmenting an amphibious deployment or operation," and "occupying or augmenting an advanced lodgement." Proposed doctrine states:

The purpose of a PREPO AFLOAT operation is to project a heavy force early in a crisis capable of complimenting other early arriving forces; rapidly reinforce a lodgement established by Army early entry forces and /or by USMC amphibious assault elements (e.g., an Army Light Division or a MAGTF); to protect key objectives (port, airfield, etc); and be prepared to conduct subsequent operations across the range or military operations."⁵⁹

The USMC and USA prepositioning afloat programs are not competitive. This complimentary nature is discussed in a number of articles written by generals of both services. Brigadier General Robert A. Chilcoat, USA, former Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and co-author Major David S. Henderson, USA, assigned to War Plans Division in the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate of the Army Staff states:

APA does not directly compete with the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) program of the Marine Corps. . . Together these two programs exemplify the phrase on the front cover of Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, namely, 'Joint Warfare is Team Warfare.' APA complements MPF operations and is the base for a more rapid introduction of Army units into a crisis area.⁶⁰

General Carl Mundy, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, previously Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and II Marine Expeditionary Force, believes,

Strategically, the Marine Corps and the Army prepositioning programs work in tandem. . . . APA and MPF complement the two services' strategic and operational roles and ultimately provide joint force

commanders and the National Command Authorities with greater flexibility.⁶¹

Command relationships during APA operations are driven by a number of factors. Primarily, the phase of the operation will have the greatest influence on the command structure used. Phases of an APA operation can be identified by the "dominant ongoing activity." These phased activities are: Planning, Alert, Deployment, Theater Reception and Onward Movement, Employment, Redeployment, and Regeneration of Equipment for PREPO AFLOAT Ships. For the purpose of this study the command relationship will be considered from Planning Phase through the Employment Phase. Doctrine vaguely identifies the document for establishing the relationships as an "initiating directive or as directed by higher authority." It refers to the command relationships as "changes of operational control (OPCON)" which will occur between the commanders during the various stages of an APA operation. Because of the nature of the crisis response criteria-- rapid, flexible, and mobile; the command relationships are likely to be complex and require coordination over large geographic areas. Although no one organization can include all the possible variations that may very well develop during an amphibious reinforcement, planners must rely upon some basic points that will not change regardless of the employment option used.⁶²

The commands involved in employment of the APA are predictable. Use of contingency planning tools such as JOPES, generic plans and documents can be developed through command post exercises. Consistent players using practiced procedures with formatted documents will facilitate both planning and execution of afloat prepositioning operations. Peacetime managers of APA should be able to establish

critical information with the correct players on each staff as units transition to a contingency operation. During peacetime CINC, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has COCOM of program assets. Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC) maintains administrative control and manages the contracts between the shipping companies and the government. CINC, US Pacific Command (USPACOM) exercises OPCON for siting and schedule shipping. US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) and US Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) maintain administrative direction, support, management, and accountability of the Army equipment and supplies onboard the shipping.⁶³

Unity of command is a US warfighting principle that places the responsibility for successful military operations at the supported CINC level. APA draft doctrine in identifying the supported CINC's relationship to afloat prepositioning operations describes this relationship:

Commanders-in-Chief (commanders of unified commands) have overall responsibility to plan deployment and employment of forces in their theater of operations. Communication between appropriate supported/supporting CINCs involved in a PREPO AFLOAT operation is essential to ensure clear understanding of what is required and what each is contributing to the operation. This latter aspect will reduce duplication of effort.⁶⁴

During a crisis, a unified combatant commander will normally be identified in an Alert/Planning Order using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The supported CINC will exercise COCOM most probably through a JFC (see Figure 1). The supported CINC or designated JFC will issue an "Initiating Directive" following JP 0-2 guidance, which will identify supported and supporting commander relationships, as well as providing guidance on other command and control relationships necessary for successful accomplishment of strategic objectives. Key players in

establishing such relationships are the service component commanders. Integrating Army and Naval expeditionary forces successfully begins at the joint staff level where service expertise coordinates capabilities, limitations, and program unique characteristics. Command relationships included in the initiating directive as identified/coordinated by service components will include by phase the change of operational control (CHOP) of various commanders. Some of the commanders involved are: Naval Fleet Commander, Joint Force Commander, Commander Army Forces (ARFOR), Commander Marine Forces (MARFOR), Commander Amphibious Task Force/Commander Maritime Prepositioning Force (Joint Force Maritime Component), and Commander Landing Force (Maritime Joint Force Land Component).⁶⁵

Army Corps/Division Commander when identified as a contingency force, has OPCON of army forces and provides assistance to CINC/ASCC with the APA portion of an initiating directive. When directed by appropriate authority OPCON shifts to the JFC. JFC/ARFOR will task the Heavy Brigade Commander with security/defense of the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) during the theater reception and onward movement phase. Brigade Commander(s), will establish the off-load and preparation party, support the JFC/ARFOR with development of the concept of operations, courses of action, and the commander's estimates. Naval Expeditionary forces may participate as both supported and/or supporting forces depending on the situation, and may include a Fleet Commander, a Carrier Task Force/Group Commander, an Amphibious Group Commander, and a Marine Force Commander. Additionally, Third US Army executes the APA for Army Force Command (FORSCOM) and provides direct peacetime links to geographic CINCs, MTMC, MSC, and the Air Mobility Command.⁶⁶

Summary of PREPO AFLOAT Operation Phases

Planning. During deliberate and crisis action planning, use of PREPO AFLOAT should be considered as a possible course of action (COA). Contingency plans prepare for a crisis deployment and cease when the brigade receives an warning/alert order. Execution planning then begins by modifying existing contingency plans, developing specific courses of action.

Alert Phase. This phase begins with the receipt of an CJCS Alert order which authorizes force movement to aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and commences the airlift to crisis area. Liaison officers, the off-load preparation party (OPP), and the advance party are the first elements required to move.

Deployment Phase. This phase begins with the departure of the main body to an APOE and/or when the PREPO ships commence movement to a seaport of debarkation (SPOD). Deployment phase and alert phase may be concurrent as PREPO ships may begin movement (considered repositioning) during the alert phase. Deployment phase is complete when the all the main body arrives at the APOE.

Theater Reception and Onward Movement Phase. This phase commences when the first ship arrives and/or the main body lands at the APOD/SPOD. It ends and the employment phase begins when equipment and supplies from the ships are married up with personnel, who have established necessary command, control, and communications to commence movement forward as tactical units.

Employment Phase. The heavy brigade commences tactical operations in support of JFLCC/ARFOR mission.

Redeployment and Regeneration Phases are critical to the APA program success, but are outside the scope of this study.⁶⁷

Finally, security is a critical element throughout all phases, and requires close coordination from each unit and across every service boundary. Identified in the APA draft doctrine as "ultimately the responsibility of CINC and ARFOR commander, security of the TAA is tasked to the heavy brigade commander,"⁶⁸ and requires the close coordinations of all forces present. Although each situation will be different in detail, there are common considerations which will require assignment of specific security responsibilities. Teamwork in the joint environment requires planners to develop the best fix whether it is single weapon system, or joint mix of a layered defense. Areas of vital concern are: "air space control, area air defense, ground security, sea security areas (coastal and harbor), fire support coordination, and movement control inland."⁶⁹

Conclusion

The move to fighting as one Armed Force is genuine. It has been mandated by law and supported by each of the services. There is joint doctrine for conducting Joint Operations which will be used in forming a Joint Force. There is joint doctrine for amphibious operations, which is used regularly in exercises and contingency operations. There is doctrine for the conduct of USMC Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operations, and the Army has a draft version in progress for Army Prepositioned Afloat operations. There is joint doctrine, service specific USN/USMC and USA doctrine, with continuous efforts on the part of each service to refine guidance to enhance joint operations. The draft field Army manual could very easily be published as joint doctrine. It addresses in general terms inclusion of each of the other services. The perspective then is always

joint even if the title is not. The lessons learned reflect positively on this same trend toward jointness. The recognition of the need for operating jointly has been rather steadfast, although the service desire to do so has fluctuated. There has been steady improvement toward jointness with an acceleration in cooperation in the recent past. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, and VIGILANT WARRIOR, each clearly indicate US forces can do joint operations. Yet, each operation has also provided examples of areas to be improved, and signals that if ignored could prove exceptionally costly in national resources. Chapter Four draws conclusions which acknowledges that sufficient doctrine exists in which to conduct joint operations. It also presents recommendations in light of recent lessons learned, as to which doctrine to use to structure the command and control organization to reinforce an amphibious operations with an afloat preposition force (APF).

Endnotes

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 6.

²Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986), 273.

³U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1994), ii.

⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 1 Dec 86, w/chg 1, 21 Apr 89 (Washington, DC: JCS, 1989), 3-1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: JCS, 1993), II-5.

⁷JCS, JP 3-0, II-19.

⁸K. Scott Lawrence. "Joint C² Through Unity of Command." Joint Force Quarterly No. 6 (Winter 1994-1995): 108.

⁹JCS, JP 3-0, II-7.

¹⁰Analysis based on author's experience during two years teaching amphibious operations (emphasis on interoperability), and conducting war gaming at the operational and tactical level at Tactical Training Group Atlantic (TACTRAGRULANT). One initiative adopted by TACTRAGRULANT was to include writing of an Amphibious Initiating Directive by students acting as Joint Force Commander's staff. JP 0-2 para 3-17 was used as checklist to ensure vital information was included in the JFC's directive. Results provided clearer concept of operations, with fewer misunderstandings in the execution of the seminar war game that followed the planning.

¹¹JCS, JP 3-0, II-10, 11; JP 0-2, 3-18, 19.

¹²Joint Chiefs of Staff, User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: JCS, 1992), I-1.

¹⁴Ibid., II-7.

¹⁵Ibid., II-1.

¹⁶Ibid., II-5.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., II-8, 9.

¹⁹JCS, JP 3-02, II-3.

²⁰JCS, JP 3-02, II-2.

²¹Ibid., II-2.

²²Ibid., II-3, 4.

²³Ibid., II-13.

²⁴Department of the Navy, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations, Naval Warfare Publication 22-8 (Rev. D). (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, September 1989).

²⁵JCS, JP 3-02, II-14, 15.

²⁶Ibid., II-10.

²⁷Ibid., II-5.

²⁸Ibid., II-4.

²⁹Ibid., II-15.

³⁰Ibid., II-9.

³¹Ibid.

³²Department of the Navy, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, Naval Warfare Publication 22-10/Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-5. (Norfolk VA: Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Command, September 1993), 2-7.

³³Ibid., 8-1.

³⁴Ibid., 2-7, 3-10, and observations by this author of joint exercises employing amphibious and MPF doctrine revealed the only difficulties encountered were not doctrinal but unfamiliarity with published doctrine by force elements new to either amphibious and/or MPF operations.

³⁵Ibid., 3-3.

³⁶Ibid., 2-7.

³⁷Ibid., 2-5 and 2-6.

³⁸Ibid., 2-5.

³⁹Dept. of Navy, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations, 1-9; Dept. of Navy, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, 2-5.

⁴⁰Dept. of Navy, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, 2-4 and 2-5.

⁴¹Ibid., 2-4.

⁴²Ibid., 2-16 para 1.5.1.

⁴³Ibid., para 1.5.2. and p 2-6, 2-18.

⁴⁴Ibid., para 1.5.3. and p 2-6, 2-20.

⁴⁵Ibid., para 1.5.4, and p 2-6, 2-23.

⁴⁶Ibid., 3-8.

⁴⁷Commander, Surface Warfare Development Group, "Maritime Prepositioning Force Command and Control," Tactical Memorandum PZ0022-3-94/Fleet Marine Force Operational Handbook 1-5-4. (Norfolk, VA: COMSURFWARDEVGRU, n.d.), 1, 7.

⁴⁸Ibid., 5-1.

⁴⁹Ibid., 1-2.

⁵⁰Ibid., 1-3.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., 1-4.

⁵³Ibid., 3-1, 3-2.

⁵⁴Ibid., 3-3.

⁵⁵John H. Tilelli, Jr., "Force Projection: Essential to Army Doctrine." Military Review (January, 1994): 44.

⁵⁶USA., "FM 100-17-1," 1-9, 1-10; Tilelli, "Force Projection," 45.

⁵⁷Tilelli, "Force Projection," 45.

⁵⁸USA., "FM 100-17-1 Army Prepositioned Afloat," Version 3 Draft (HQ, Department of the Army, N.D.), 1-2.

⁵⁹Ibid., 1-3.

⁶⁰Robert A. Chilcoat, and David S. Henderson. "Army Prepositioning Afloat." Joint Force Quarterly No. 4 (Spring 1994): 52.

⁶¹Carl E. Mundy, Jr. "Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare." Joint Force Quarterly No. 4 (Spring 1994): 50.

⁶²USA., "FM 100-17-1," 1-6 through 2-12 passim.

⁶³Ibid., 1-6.

⁶⁴Ibid., 2-2.

⁶⁵Ibid., 1-6 thru 1-8.

⁶⁶Ibid., 2-5 thru 2-7; 2-12; 3-8, 3-14.

⁶⁷Ibid., 1-10, 1-11.

⁶⁸Ibid., 3-14.

⁶⁹Ibid., 3-11, 3-14.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The research shows the optimum command and control organization for a Joint Force Commander to integrate and establish the Army Prepositioned Afloat force ashore to reinforce an amphibious assault is as written in Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. The research consistently produced the same conclusion, that the principles of war of unity of command and simplicity were best supported by the doctrinal role of CATF as a supported commander, and CLF in a supporting role with OPCON of all land forces. Although there are doctrinal differences between how the MPF and APA operations are conducted, there are no doctrinal incompatibilities which preclude either force from being employed during a single amphibious operation. There are, however, potential difficulties when employing MPF and APA nearly simultaneously, that must be recognized and guarded against. Two the research uncovered are, interservice rivalry and planners who do not have a comprehensive understanding of the differences between MPF/APA operations. The conclusions section in this chapter answers the primary and secondary questions in light of lessons learned and a comparison of MPF and APA operational capabilities. It also includes a scenario of a phased operation with the rationale for its use as a basis for recommendations. Finally, this chapter recommends the JFC use the first option, with CATF as a supported commander in an amphibious assault which includes an immediate reinforcement operation. It also

recommends when to use the second option with the Navy in a supporting role and the Land Force Commander as the supported commander.

Conclusions

The JFC's decision to conduct an APA reinforcement of an amphibious assault will establish a heavy brigade able to conduct sustained land operations deep inland, to the USMC amphibious forces previously landed. The purpose for such an operation will most certainly influence and shape the JFC's command and control organization, that is, the choice of who shall command the land forces, USMC or USA. The mission of the land force will dictate its composition and therefore establish specific requirements which would best qualify either a USA or USMC General to command the force. Perhaps such considerations may be a topic for additional research as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. The research looked at the command and control organization a JFC required to accomplish the deployment of forces into a theater using amphibious forces to secure a lodgement. To further narrow the analysis of the JFC command and control options, only those specific to conducting an amphibious assault reinforced by MPF and APA operations were considered. No matter how the JFC exercises command and control over the amphibious force, whether the CATF reports to a Naval Force Component Commander, or reports directly to the JFC as a subordinate JTF, the principle of unity of command brings the responsibility for execution of the amphibious assault and the immediate reinforcement operations through the CATF.

The research, in answering the secondary questions, determined there were no obvious doctrinal incompatibilities. Both MPF and APA are compatible with joint doctrine for amphibious operations, and establish the CINC/JFC as the authority with an inherent responsibility to ensure

the development of a workable command and control organization. It is clearly presented throughout both service doctrines that the complexity of the APF operations, as well as the variety of situations that may be encountered, require that the CINC/JFC retain maximum flexibility to shape the command and control organization. This philosophy has been documented as supported in APF lessons learned, both during Desert Shield and Restore Hope.

Differences exist in how things are accomplished, but there are no incompatibilities that would prevent either from executing operations based on current doctrine. Some of the differences in execution and employment require coordination to blend tactics, techniques, and procedures, but neither force's doctrine worked against the principles of war of unity of command/unity of effort or simplicity. The predominant issues will most likely be timing of the arrival, and terrain management. The sheer volume of equipment being moved through the arrival and assembly area is beyond the ability of most to comprehend. As seen in each operation when crisis planning time lines have been condensed, the need for all participants to plan together early on is absolutely critical. Doctrinally, deployment phases for both MPF/APA are generally the same. Both require concurrent, detailed and parallel planning by all very early in the operation. Including a reinforcement phase in the planning for an amphibious operation will establish both the principles of unity of command and simplicity from the beginning of the operation.

The research of lessons learned indicates essentially two issues of general concern to a JFC and a CATF--interservice rivalry and the difference between MPF and APA operations. The research clearly indicates interservice rivalry still has genuine potential to interfere with

operations. Although it is disappearing from all levels of the US organization, there are indications of competition related to service program survival, which the prudent will not ignore. In Restore Hope there seemed to be duplication of effort by the USMC and USA prepositioning programs in an attempt to get there first. Familiarity with both programs and a non-service view to phasing and tasking will require a genuine joint perspective during planning and execution. This requires an understanding of how MPF/APA similarities and difference can be employed in a complimentary way so as to become a force multiplier. It is at the planning level the danger of interservice rivalry has its greatest influence either intentional (a biased decision), or accidental (inadequate knowledge of the MPF/APA). It is doubtful that there would be any rivalry large enough to create a catastrophic failure of an operation, yet the potential for inefficiency in the early stages to compound into dramatic impact later can not be dismissed. The research in this area was limited by the sensitive nature of the issues during the latest operation (VIGILANT WARRIOR), and, therefore, cannot be officially documented. Caution is recommended to guard against decisions which may be made with an unintentional service bias. Research confirmed that the writers of doctrine, and those who execute the APF operations, view the use of afloat prepositioning force (APF) operations not as USMC and USA service operations, rather as APF surge and sustainment phases of a joint operation using the USMC and USA programs respectively.

Second, the issue of differences between the MPF and APA should be considered in order to best synchronize their deployment. Although developed to provide the same fix, that is, a rapid deployment into a combat theater, they are different. As has been stated earlier, both

force packages are complimentary, not competitive. The purpose of this study was not to show one superior to the other, or promote the use of one above the other. The acknowledgment of difference in capability is only to explain the rationale for the order of phasing chosen in support of an amphibious operation.

The USMC fights as a regimental integrated unit. As such the MPF equipment is prepositioned to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade from the Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON) of 4 or 5 ships. Once ashore and composited the USMC represents a credible combined arms combat force. If all three MPSRONs off-load they composite a Marine Expeditionary Force which fights as a Corps. The Army fights as brigade task forces that assemble to division sized force.¹¹ The heavy brigade equipment is embarked on eight ships and is accompanied by one lighterage aboard ship (LASH). Once ashore and composited the USA represents one heavy brigade of a division which will be composited with other brigades of the division to form the combined arms force. The USMC can be introduced as an individual brigade and is a smaller integrated combined arms force, while the USA is generally considered the larger combat heavy force.

Another significant difference is in the capability of the ships which carry the equipment. APA carries all the lighterage for off loading on one ship. The MPSRONs carry sufficient organic lighterage on each ship to off-load that ship. Fuel delivery is another ship characteristic unique to the MPSRONs. Each unit is capable of pumping fuel from 2 miles off-shore using a four point moor and floating hoseline. The Army draft doctrine identifies a critical need to source APA fuel as, "Neither sustainment package contains bulk fuel. Therefore, the Joint Force

Commander (JFC) must ensure that bulk fuel is provided when the heavy brigade arrives in the theater of operations."² Such differences do not promote one force above the other, rather they indicate a clean logic for phasing their employment during an amphibious operation.

These differences support a JFC decision to reinforce the amphibious assault using the USMC first, and is based on several factors. The USMC capability to rapidly deploy and composite a credible self-sustained combined arms force is unquestioned. The MPF with its sealift provides the surge sustainment that ensures expansion of the lodgement. Use of Marines in the initial reinforcement is supported by common doctrine, tactic, technique, and procedures, which have been honed by previous exercises and operations. Similar forces trained and ready can execute the necessary build up and passing through lines with maximum efficiency and speed. This will allow the MPSRON, which requires a relatively secure environment for off-load, to enter early and push the limits of envelope of opportunity. The smaller segments of force build up using MPSRONs will expand the volume of terrain on which to composite larger forces without creating a grid-locked assembly area. The integrated combined combat arms capability of the USMC provides maximum firepower for its size, and will ensure lodgement security supporting reception and onward movement of sustaining heavy USA forces.

Using the USMC MPF first will also establish an environment for a more rapid throughput for APA. Using the complimentary differences discussed above the MPSRONs can establish lighterage for immediate off loading capability of APA. They can also establish and maintain a refueling capability via four point mooring technique, the ability to pump fuel across an open beach from 2 miles at sea. Further the MPF can

establish assembly areas at the seaport and airport, and secure the road networks to arrival and assembly areas for marry up of troops and equipment, which can also be used and/or expanded by the USA follow-on forces. The USMC MPF, building and expanding from the initial lodgement established by the assault, creates the room and secure environment to bring in the larger force with its heavier combat capability. The above discussion illustrates how the differences develop a synergistic force multiplier, and is the basis for the following recommendations.

Recommendations

The basic scenario establishes the requirement for a JFC to conduct a forcible entry via an amphibious assault. The Amphibious Task Force mission is to establish a lodgement to support subsequent combat missions as assigned by the CINC. It is the JFC's determination that compositing a land force of one Marine Expeditionary Force, reinforced by one MPF brigade and one USA APA heavy brigade will provide the necessary combat force to support the CINC's campaign plan. In such a scenario, CATF becomes the supported commander and CLF the supporting commander, for the conduct of an amphibious assault with subsequent reinforcement by APF operations.

Using Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, the CATF as the supported commander will tailor his staff to provide the requisite expertise to conduct successful operations. It is critical that the planning staff include MPF and APA subject matter experts who will ensure the unique requirements, capabilities and limitations are considered as plans are developed. As discussed in Chapter Three, the detailed, concurrent, and parallel planning conducted in the Plan Phase utilizes a coequal command relationship between commanders assigned to the ATF. It

is in an environment of free exchange of information that the complex plan can be developed. CATF is the coordinating executive agent in developing and presenting the final assault plan to the JFC for approval. Once approved, CATF becomes responsible for execution.

The principle of unity of command is supported through CATF's staff focusing the planning effort of all operations to be conducted, both in the amphibious objective area and in support of the amphibious assault outside of the AOA. It is the CATF's staff that ensures economy of effort is also maintained. By coordinating the plans of all participants, duplication of effort is reduced and the most appropriate unit for the task is assigned. As the plan is developed, CATF's staff ensures the plan is able to be supported by each service component. As each participant builds their portion of the operation, the coequal commanders check for fit--is this feasible, does it support the principle of simplicity? The rehearsal is the final check of the plan, that all the pieces fit together. It is the CATF's responsibility to bring all players together, and ensure the environment is established in the AOA, through which the landing forces may proceed from the sea and establish the ability to conduct sustained land operations in support of the CINC's campaign objectives.

CLF as a supporting commander makes the major contribution to the development of the assault plan. The supporting-supported relationship between CATF and CLF is one developed out of the complex and difficult task of moving land forces across an ocean, and then projecting them into a hostile environment from the sea. The majority of the naval responsibility upon arrival and closing to contact with the enemy on the ground, is to provide a "yes we can support that maneuver from the sea,"

vote to the CLF. It is the CLF's staff, normally co-located with CATF's staff, who develops the scheme of maneuver ashore. All things support the scheme of maneuver, to include immediate reinforcement. CLF's staff contributes to unity of command and economy of effort through close and continuous liaison during the detailed, concurrent, and parallel planning efforts maintained throughout the operation. During the Plan Phase of the operation, both the MPF MAGTF commander, and the APA Division/Brigade commander are critical contributors to the plans to expand the lodgement. It is during the staffing of the plans presented to the JFC for approval, that the support of the principles of unity of command/economy of effort and simplicity are firmly laid.

In the above scenario, CLF is OPCON to CATF. CATF exercises command and control of the MPF brigade and APA brigade through CLF. The deployment timing and employment of these brigades are approved by CATF as recommended by the CLF, in order to support scheme of maneuver ashore. Once CLF has established the requisite command and control facilities ashore, responsibility for those functions are phased ashore, with the amphibious task force monitoring the functions afloat, able to resume them in an emergency. When CLF is ready to assume authority for subsequent combat operations, CATF and CLF agreeing the ATF mission is complete, CATF reports to JFC. Upon accepting the CATF's report that the ATF mission is complete, the JFC will disestablish the amphibious task force.

A second option which provides the JFC a command and control structure, changes the role of the Commander of the Land Forces to a supported commander, and the role of the Commander, Navy Support Force to a supporting commander. The research discovered a proposed change to MPF doctrine that may be employed with both the MPF and APA. This option is

only recommended under certain conditions, that is after the amphibious assault has been completed, and the JFC has disestablished the AOA and the amphibious task force. Additionally, two other conditions should exist. First the MPF and APA phases of the operation should not be considered part of the amphibious assault, and there needs to be sufficient time between phases to prevent confusion among the planning staffs. Second, the Commander of the Land Force, whether an USMC or USA general officer, must have the requisite joint staff (USA, USN, and USMC) expertise to plan and execute both MPF and APA operations. The requirement for knowledgeable and experienced liaison officers cannot be overstated.

The second command and control option streamlines the command lines by significantly changing the Navy command relationship in each phase of the operation. Essential responsibilities and functions of the commanders during each phase of the MPF operations as described in NWP 22-10 are not changed, only the command authority has been altered. By establishing the Navy role as a supporting role, the USMC and USA commanders do not report to a Navy commander, rather they report to the Land Force Commander ashore. The rationale for introducing USMC MPF first remains the same. The Naval Component Commander/Joint Maritime Component Commander of the JFC will replace the Commander Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) with the Commander Navy Supporting Force (CNSF). CNSF will provide the necessary USN support during each phase of the APF operation, to include both MPF and APA operations. In this scenario the Land Force Commander is responsible throughout each phase vice the CATF/CMPF.

When separated by sufficient time from the assault phase of an amphibious operation this option is a much simpler operation. It clearly supports the JFC with direct command and control lines via his Land Force

Commander, from deployment through employment of combat forces. This command and control structure is recommended for use when time is available after an amphibious assault, to build up reinforcement forces in country, and when there is not a pressing requirement to conduct MPF reinforcement immediately following the assault. It will also be a preferred command and control structure when the decision to employ an APF reinforcement is made after the conclusion of an amphibious assault, as in a case of a subsidiary landing which yielded a tactical advantage to be exploited. Use of this structure during an amphibious operation, however, will more than likely confuse and convolute the command and control organization.

In summary, the research confirms the command and control structure presented in Joint Amphibious Doctrine as the JFC's optimum method for executing an APF reinforcement of an amphibious operation. The use of APF in any operation will require participants who possess a genuine "jointness" and are knowledgeable of both joint doctrine and the service doctrine of participating forces. Are US forces finally a real Joint Team? A RAND study of command and control of joint air operations observed that there was a "common element" to successful joint operations when looking at the Battle of Midway, the Solomon campaign, and the withdrawal of Xth Corps from Korea. The element they saw was not really a new observation, as it is common knowledge that when facing a foe which presents the very real potential to defeat us, we fight as a seamless team. The prospect of a catastrophic defeat at the hands of a common enemy unites even the most bitter antagonists. The RAND conclusion which followed this observation appears to have found fulfillment in today's congressionally mandated jointness and fiscal reality: "To gain this

degree of urgency and willingness to sacrifice in peacetime planning an organization will require the invocation of an equivalent threat to the continuing lives of the services themselves."³ Why the US military is becoming a genuine joint force is an interesting question. The lessons learned seem to indicate we are, in fact, fighting more as a joint team. As long as the USN, USMC, and USA remain determined to fight as a joint team, and continue to train their Afloat Prepositioning Forces as a joint program, we will be ready to project a credible sized combined arms force rapidly, any where, any time.

Endnotes

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- USMC., Operation Restore Hope Collection and Lessons Learned Project Report. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA: 27 April 1993.
- USN, 5th NLLDB, Release 1993 (9305) OCEAN VENTURE 93 Lessons Learned. (SECRET)

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